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CONGRESSIONAL PAPERS, JUDICIAL
SUBPOENAS, AND THE CONSTITUTION

David Kaye*

INTRODUCTION

For at least a century, and with increasing frequency in recent
years, grand juries, public prosecutors, criminal defendants, and

private litigants have sought, subpoena in hand, to wrest papers
from Congress.' By and large, Congress has honored these subpoenas.2 Yet, even in the course of compliance, Congress often
* Associate Professor of Law, Arizona State University; J.D. 1972, Yale
Law School; A.M. 19,69, Harvard University; S.B. 1968, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology.
1 Many of these incidents are recounted in Kaye, Congressional Papers
and Judicial Subpoenas, 23 UCLA L. REV. 57 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Congressional Papers]. The word "Congress" will be used in this paper to refer to
both houses of Congress.
2 The Congressional Record is replete with resolutions authorizing compliance. See Congressional Papers, note 1 supra; Cox, Executive Privilege, 122
U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1393-95 (1974).
Congressional responses to subpoenas
duces tecum arising since the publication of these articles include H.R. Res. 1429,
94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. H7822 (daily ed. July 27, 1976) (grand
jury subpoena); H.R. Res. 1384-85, id. at H6991-92 (daily ed. June 29, 1976)
(grand jury subpoenas); H.R. Res. 1273-74, id. at H5500-01 (daily ed. June 9,
1976) (grand jury subpoenas); H.R. Res. 1233, id. at H5169-70 (daily ed. June 2,
1976) (grand jury subpoena); H.R. Res. 1122, id. at H2617 (daily ed. Mar. 31,
1976) (order for production in civil case); H.R. Res. 1082, id. at H1701-02 (daily
ed. Mar. 9, 1976) (subpoenas in civil case); H.R. Res. 1001, id. at H515 (daily
ed. Jan. 19, 1976) (trial subpoena in criminal case); S. Res. 336, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess., 121 id. at S23067 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1975) (subpoenas in civil case); H.R.
Res. 947, id. at H13161 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1975) (order for production in civil
case); H.R. Res. 946, id. at H13160-61 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1975) (trial subpoena
in criminal case); S. Res. 320, id. at S21555-56 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1975) (subpoena
in civil case); H.R. Res. 903, id. at H11877-78 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1975) (subpoena
in civil case); H.R. Res. 819, id. at H10278 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1975) (grand
jury subpoena); S. Res. 273, id. at S17528 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1975) (grand jury
subpoena); H.R. Res. 717, id. at H8769-70 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1975) (grand
jury subpoena); H.R. Res. 709, id. at H8621 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1975) (trial
subpoena in criminal case); H.R. Res. 663, id. at 117946-47 (daily ed. July 31,
1975) (grand jury subpoena); H.R. Res. 519, id. at H5178 (daily ed. June 10,
1975) (trial subpoena in criminal case); S. Res. 105-08 & 170, id. at S3561-63
(daily ed. Mar. 11, 1975) & S9094 (daily ed. May 22, 1975) (trial subpoenas in
criminal case); H.R. Res. 156, id. at H671 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1975) (grand jury
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asserts that "by the privileges of [Congress] no evidence of a
documentary character under the control and in the possession of
[Congress] can, by the mandate of process of the ordinary
courts of justice, be taken from such control or possession but by
its permission

.

In a previous article, I attempted to demonstrate that
language such as this can be traced back to earlier congressional
claims of privilege which were limited to refusals to produce only
4
original copies of congressional papers. I argued that the routine
reiteration of these words in modern times does not necessarily

represent a more expansive claim on the part of recent Congresses.'

Nevertheless, it is possible that contemporary Congresses
have lost sight of the original scope of their predecessors'
assertions of privilege and now claim an absolute privilege to withhold both the originals and copies of subpoenaed papers. A few
judicial opinions suggest as much or more,' and, in a field virtually

devoid of judicial precedent, it is possible that even cursorily
7

documented, ill-considered dicta can take root and flourish.
This Article will chart the constitutional boundaries of Con-

gress' privilege to withhold its internal papers8 from judicial sub-

subpoena). Cf. S. Res. 175, id. at S9712 (daily ed. June 5, 1975) (authorizing
Comptroller General to comply with any subpoena for financial disclosure statements in connection with criminal trials or investigations).
In the relatively few instances in which Congress has withheld the information, the question of congressional privilege has not been conclusively litigated.
See, e.g., Congressional Papers, supra note 1, at 72-75; S. Res. 409, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. S4089 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1976); S. Res. 336, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., 121 id. at S23066 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1975); H.R. Res. 940,
id. at H13017-18 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1975); notes 130 & 158 infra.
3 S. Res. 320, note 2 supra; H.R. Res. 947, note 2 supra.
The earlier claims of
4 Congressional Papers, supra note 1, at 59-66.
and agents refrain
members
its
that
concern
Congress'
reflected
privilege also
from releasing possibly privileged material without explicit authorization. Id.
See note 16 infra.
5 CongressionalPapers,supra note 1, at 76.
6 See, e.g., Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 738-40, 772-73 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; Wilkey, J., dissenting); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1081-82 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wilkey,,J.,
concurring); see also Brief for Respondent at 60-61, United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683 (1974), reprinted in UNITED STATES v. NIXON: THE PRESIDENT
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 320, 357-58 (L. Friedman ed. 1974) [hereinafter
cited as UNITED STATES v. NIXON]; Brief for Petitioner at 35-36, Nixon v. Sirica,
supra; Brief for Appellee at 21-22, Senate Select Comm. on Pres. Campaign
Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
7 See O'Brien, The Dissenting Opinions of Nixon v. Sirica: An Argument
for Executive Privilege in the White House Tapes Controversy, 28 Sw. L.J. 373
(1974).
8 References to the "internal papers" of Congress or "congressional papers"
are meant to include all evidence of a documentary character which is under the
control and in the possession of Congress.
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poena.' The privileges expressly given Congress in the text of the
Constitution as well as the privileges that might be implied from our
constitutional structure and history will be surveyed.'" This examination will reveal that while the Constitution does give Congress the privilege of refusing to comply" with subpoenas for documents in limited circumstances, it does not supply the absolute,
unreviewable power that, in the view of some observers,' 2 Congress has arrogated to itself.
I.

EXPRESS CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGES

The express constitutional provisions that bear on Congress'
right to maintain the confidentiality of its papers are contained in
article I. The publication clause, 13 the immunity from arrest
clause,' 4 and the speech or debate clause" are the most pertinent. 6 Each of these clauses has been adduced, at one time or
9 The phrase "judicial subpoenas" denotes those enforceable by the judiciary and issued by litigants or grand juries. Subpoenas issued by administrative
agencies are not considered in this Article, for few if any administrative subpoenas
have been served on legislators or legislative personnel. The constitutional questions that might arise from such subpoenas are the same as those generated by
judicial subpoenas, although the interests in discovery are somewhat different.
For a discussion of compulsory process and other techniques of information
gathering available to administrative agencies, see G. ROBINSON & E. GELLHORN,
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS

385-405 (1974).

10 Express constitutional privileges are discussed in text accompanying notes
13-204 infra. Possible implied privileges are discussed in text accompanying notes
205-43 infra.
11 Privileges protecting congressional papers, like other evidentiary privileges, should be asserted in an appropriate judicial form if they are to be honored
by the courts. See United States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76, 82-83 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
1 T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 275 n.2 (8th ed. 1927). Cf. United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (executive privilege); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 505 n.25 (1969) (speech or debate privilege). Usually
Congress will be able to assert its privileges in enforcement proceedings, see, e.g.,
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 499 n.13 (1975);
note 158 infra. However, it may choose to do so at an earlier stage. See, e.g.,
.note 97 infra. Courts may occasionally be willing to find privileges even in the
absence of a formal claim. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 29-36 infra.
12 See authorities cited in notes 6 & 7 supra.
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl.3.
14 Id. § 6, cl.
2.
15 Id. § 6, cl. 3.
16 Claims of congressional privilege over papers might also be based on
Congress' disciplinary and rule-making power or Congress' general law-making
power. Article I, section 5, provides that "[e]ach House may determine the Rules
of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the
Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member." Id. § 5, cl.2. Pursuant to this
rule-making power, the Senate has declared that "[n]o memorial or other paper
presented to the Senate, except original treaties finally acted upon, shall be withdrawn from its files except by order of the Senate." Senate Standing Rule 30, in
SENATE COMM. ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION, STANDING RULES OF THE UNITED
STATES SENATE 51 [hereinafter cited as STANDING RULES]. Cf. H.R. Res. 9, 94th
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another, in support of congressional claims of privilege over internal papers.
A.

The PublicationClause

The publication clause provides that "[e]ach House shall keep

a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the
same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require
Secrecy .... -17 This language has recently been cited as
constitutional support for congressional claims of a privilege to
resist judicial requests for a certain type of documentary
evidence' S-transcripts of testimony given to executive sessions"
of congressional investigating committees.20 The courts have
examined the relationship of the publication clause to refusals to
give up such transcripts in two cases which for other reasons have
had considerable notoriety.21 The first case is United States v.
Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. H20 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1975).

Rules made pursuant to the rule-making power are binding (unless unconstitutional on other
grounds) in that a member, aide or employee who violated them would be subject
to the disciplinary powers of the house, including the contempt power. Reinstein
& Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV.
1113, 1178-79 (1973). However, article I, § 5, cl.2, goes no further than to
allow Congress to prescribe disciplinary rules for its members in the interest of
orderly proceedings. This power to impose internal sanctions does not imply the
power to resist subpoenas or other court orders. It does not insulate members
from the duty to obey court orders even if the members may be disciplined by
their house for their compliance with the court orders. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra at 1178-80. Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 505-06 (1969)
(legislative employees acting pursuant to congressional directive); United States
ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 472-73 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (executive official acting in accordance with orders of superior); Sawyer v.
Dollar, 190 F.2d 623, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1951), vacated as moot sub nom. Land v.

Dollar, 344 U.S. 806 (1952) (same); Freund, Foreword: On Presidential Privilege, 88 H~av. L. REV. 13, 19 (1974) (legislative employees answerable for

carrying out congressional directives and cabinet officers legally accountable for
executing presidential directives).
Congress might also try to create a privilege by using its general law-making
power to enact a statutory privilege. Because Congress has shown no inclination
to enact any such statutory privilege for itself, however, this basis for a privilege
will not be discussed here.
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl.
3.
18

See note 41 infra.

19 Executive sessions involve communications to a house of Congress from
the executive department. See Senate Standing Rules 36-38, STANDING RULES,
supra note 16, at 55-61. Unless these executive sessions are declared open during
the proceeding, they are cloaked in secrecy. Id. Other proceedings may also be
held behind closed doors. See Senate Standing Rule 35, id. at 55. The rules of
both houses of Congress prohibit the release of certain executive session materials
except by affirmative vote of the house or the affected committee. See H.R. Res.
12, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 30-31 (1973); note 16 supra.
20 Congress has not been consistent in its responses to judicial requests for
such transcripts and has sporadically refused to comply with such requests. See
CongressionalPapers,supra note 1, at 71-75.
21

United States v. Ehrlichman, Crim. No. 74-116 (D.D.C. July 3, 1974),

a! 'din part, 44 U.S.L.W. 2543 (D.C. Cir. May 17, 1976), petition for cert. filed,

45 U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1976); Calley v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 650
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Ehrlichman,2 2 a criminal prosecution for a warrantless search of
a psychiatrist's office instigated by White House officials."3 In this
case, defendant G. Gordon Liddy issued subpoenas for transcripts

of testimony of government witnesses who had appeared before
the House Armed Services Special Subcommittee on Intelli-

gence. 4 When it seemed that the House would not honor the
subpoenas, 25 the district court ruled that the transcripts were privileged under the publication clause 26 and that Liddy had no right
to require their production. 27 The court of appeals, however,
(M.D. Ga. 1974), rev'd, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
911 (1976).
The convictions of defend22 Crim. No. 74-116 (D.D.C. July 3, 1974).
ants Ehrlichman and Liddy were affirmed, United States v. Ehrlichman, 44
U.S.L.W. 2543 (D.C. Cir. May 17, 1976), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W.
3437 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1976); United States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
while those of Barker and Martinez were reversed, United States v. Barker, 44
U.S.L.W. 2544 (D.C. Cir. May 17, 1976).
23 See generally WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, REPORT 60-61
(1975) [hereinafter cited as WATERGATE REPORT]; see also note 82 infra.
24 United States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76, 82 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Congressional
Papers,supra note 1, at 74-75.
25 The House did release the testimony during the pendency of the appeal.
United States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
26 The court's initially unpublished memorandum and order of July 3,
1974, denying defendant's motion to enforce the subpoenas, does not daily in
reaching this conclusion:
In the instant case, defendant Liddy seeks a transcript of secret,
That
executive session proceedings before a House subcommittee.
transcript has been placed in the possession of the Speaker and can only
be released upon a vote of the whole House. Congress' right to invoke
such a privilege with regard to verbatim transcripts of its executive proceedings would appear to be established by the [secrecy exception of the
Publication] Clause in Article I, Section 5, Clause 3 of the Constitution.
Memorandum & Order at 3, United States v. Ehrlichman, Crim. No. 74-116
(D.D.C. July 3, 1974) (citation omitted). The court offered the alternative
holding that, in any event, the speech or debate clause prohibited judicial enforcement of the subpoena. See note 128 & accompanying text infra. The memorandum opinion has been reprinted in Hearings on Representation of Congress and
Congressional Interests in Court Before the Subconim. on Separation of Powers
of the Senate Comn. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 229-30 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
27 Liddy argued that the committee's refusal to produce the transcripts violated his rights as a criminal defendant under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500
(1970), the fifth amendment due process clause, and the sixth amendment compulsory process clause. The district court found that statements made to the
legislature, rather than to executive investigatory agencies, are not within the
scope of the Jencks Act and that the due process analysis of Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963), which requires the prosecution to produce exculpatory evidence in its possession, is not applicable to the suppression of evidence by the
legislature. The court also held that the right to compulsory process does not
extend to the production of privileged material. Memorandum & Order, supra
note 26, at 2-4.
An appraisal of this aspect of the opinion concerning the rights of criminal
defendants seeking congressional testimony is more properly the subject of a
separate article analyzing the consequences to underlying litigation of a congressional refusal to comply with a subpoena duces tecum, but a few general observations will be made here. First, under the Jencks Act, a federal criminal
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dismissed these issues as "academic," holding that even if the
transcripts had been withheld under an invalid claim of condefendant is entitled at trial to a prosecution witness' prior "statements" "in the
possession of the United States."
18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1970).
A verbatim
transcript is surely a "statement" for Jencks Act purposes. See Harney v. United
States, 306 F.2d 523 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. O'Connell v. United States,
371 U.S. 911 (1962); United States v. Lev, 258 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1958), aff'd by
an equally divided court, 360 U.S. 470 (1959). See generally Palermo v. United
States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959); ABA ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS, STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY

AND

PROCEDURE

BEFORE

TRIAL

§ 2.1, Comment (1970). But whether it is a statement "in the possession of the
United States" as that phrase is used in the Act is not so clear cut. As employed
in 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a), (b), (c), (e) (.1970), "United States" plainly means the
United States as prosecutor. Presumably, the words have the same meaning in
section 3500(d), the section that necessitates disclosure and specifies sanctions for
nondisclosure. But see 103 CONG. REC. 15931 (1957) (observation by Senator
Hruska that the Act "might even extend to an executive session of a Congressional Committee"); id. at 15927 (statement of Senator Javits that the bill applies
"to all officials of the Federal Government"). Thus, the district court's observation in Ehrlichman that "there is no indication that Congress intended [the Jencks
Act] to encompass its own legislative proceedings held in executive session ....
"
Memorandum and Order, supra note 26, at 2, while arguably overstated, seems
essentially correct.
This conclusion does not imply that the Jencks Act is rigidly confined to the
discovery of material in the prosecutor's files at a particular time. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1971). It merely recognizes that the Jencks Act, like rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
is basically intended to give the defense access to the relevant evidence and information available to the prosecution. Thus, the simple fact that a statement of a
government witness is unavailable to the defense as well as the prosecution should
not trigger Jencks Act sanctions. See United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348,
355-56 (1969); Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231, 242 (1961); Campbell v.
United States, 365 U.S. 85, 98 (1961); United States v. Bryant, supra at 651.
The due process argument made by Liddy is more troublesome. The suggestion that one branch of the government may prosecute an individual while a
parallel branch holds secret information that might lead to his acquittal or to a
decision not to prosecute is offensive to due process concepts. While the Court
in Brady v. Maryland, supra, speaks of "suppression by the prosecution," and
the prosecution is not normally obliged to obtain evidence from third parties,
Brady does not hold that different agencies of the government are necessarily
severable entities. See, e.g., United States v. Deutsch, 475 F.2d 55, 57 (5th Cir.
1973); Barbee v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir. 1964);
Carlson, False or Suppressed Evidence: Why a Need for the ProsecutorialTie?,
1969 DUKE L.J. 1171. The district court in Ehrlichman therefore seems to have
disposed of the Brady due process problem too hastily when it stated:
Nor does Brady apply. The subpoenaed testimony is not in the
possession of the Government within the meaning of that decision,
since the Subcommittee is neither an investigative nor a prosecutorial
arm of the Executive branch nor an agency of the Government in any
way involved in the offense or related transactions.
Memorandum and Order, supra note 26, at 2. See also note 36 inlra.
At the same time, not every "suppression" of evidence resulting from congressional invocation of privilege amounts to a denial of due process, since information Congress refuses to release is not inexorably favorable to the defense.
It may be highly damaging, merely redundant, or simply irrelevant. See Brief
for Plaintiff at 109-10, United States v. Ehrlichman, 44 U.S.L.W. 2543 (D.C. Cir.
May 17, 1976). If Congress is unwilling to provide a transcript even for the
limited purpose of in camera inspection by the trial court, the court may request
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gressional privilege, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.2 8

The second case arose out of the court martial of Lt. William
Calley, Jr., for ithe mass murder of Vietnamese civilians at My
Lai in 1968. The military judge requested that the House release
evidence and testimony given in an executive session of the
Armed Services Subcommittee.2" The House did not accede to
3
this request,3 0 and the court martial in United States v. Calley '
held that the House's failure to release the papers was within
that a responsible legislative official or agent, such as the committee chairman
or committee counsel, review the subpoenaed material with the aid of detailed
guidelines from the prosecution and defense indicating what type of information would be exculpatory or useful for impeachment. If the committee official then informs the court that the subpoenaed material is neither exculpatory
nor useful for impeachment, the problem may be resolved without the court's
insisting on production or dismissal. A similar procedure was adopted in Ehrlichman when former President Nixon refused to allow Ehrlichman and his
counsel to inspect notes Ehrlichman had made while on the White House staff.
See Brief for Plaintiff, supra at 110; WATERGATE REPORT, supra note 23, at 61.
Even if Congress refuses to review the testimony in this fashion, or if it reports
that there are material inconsistencies between the congressional testimony and
the expected trial testimony of the witness, sanctions less drastic than dismissal
may be appropriate. Consideration should be given to precluding the prosecution
from calling the witness, to instructing the jury that the witness' credibility is in
doubt since he has testified differently on another occasion, or to giving a "missing
witness instruction" to the effect that the jury may infer inconsistency from the
government's inability to show that the witness' previous testimony is consistent.
But see Note, A Defendant's Right to Inspect Pretrial Congressional Testimony

of Government Witnesses, 80 YALE L.J. 1388 (1971).
The third argument made to overcome the privilege in Ehrlichman was based
on the criminal defendant's sixth amendment right "to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor." U.S. CONST., amend. VI, cl. 3. The court
in Ehrlichman reasoned that this right of compulsory process did not entitle Liddy
to an order compelling production because he had not made an adequate showing
of need for the transcripts. Memorandum and Order, supra note 26, at 2-3.
Moreover, the court held that because the material was privileged, dismissal was
not necessary to preserve Liddy's sixth amendment right. Id. at 3. But see
Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REv. 73, 126-31, 159-66
(1974); Westen, Compulsory Process 11, 74 MIH. L. REV. 192, 247-48 (1975).
28 Upon reviewing the subcommittee transcripts and the trial testimony of
the subcommittee witnesses, the court found that the subpoenaed materials contained no exculpatory statements and no information which could have materially
aided cross examination. Hence, the court eschewed what it called "a fruitless
discussion" concerning the applicability of the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500
(1970), Brady v. Maryland, or the sixth amendment "as to materials in the possession of Congressional Committees." United States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d at 83.
29 For a fuller discussion of this incident, see Calley v. Callaway, 382 F.
Supp. 650, 699-702 (M.D. Ga. 1974), rev'd, 519 F.2d 184, 219-20 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976); Congressional Papers, supra note 1,
at 71-73.
30 The court martial's request was apparently never brought to the attention
of the House as a whole. Calley v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 650, 702 n.47. See
note 19 supra.
3'

46 C.M.R. 1131, aff'd, 22 C.M.A. 534, 48 C.M.R. 19 (1973).
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32
the scope of the privilege delineated by the publication clause.
In granting habeas corpus relief in Calley v. Callaway,33 the district court apparently agreed with this interpretation of the clause,
but thought that, on balance, "the legislative branch was not
entitled to invoke the privilege of confidentiality at the expense
of the individual accused's right to evidence at his criminal trial."3 4
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found it unnecessary to decide
"whether the . . . Subcommittee could properly invoke its con-

gressional privilege and correctly refuse to furnish the subpoenaed

testimony."3 5 The court of appeals found that even if the publication clause privilege did not justify withholding the testimony, the unavailability of the subpoenaed material did not, in

the circumstances of the case, amount to a denial of due process.36

32 See United States v. Calley, 8 CRM. L. REP. (BNA) 2054-55 (Army
GCM, 5th Jud. Cir. 1970) (court order no. 19), reprinted in 116 CONG. REC.
37652-53 (1-970). The military appellate courts did not dispute this conclusion.
3 382 F. Supp. 650 (M.D. Ga. 1974), rev'd, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).
34 382 F. Supp. at 705. See also note 27 supra. The court relied primarily
on United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), the Watergate Tapes case, for
this conclusion. Chief Judge Elliot interpreted Nixon to mean that any evidentiary privilege based on the generalized need for confidentiality in government is
not absolute, but subject to judicial balancing. Id. at 704. This holding vindicated, almost before it was written, Professor Henkin's prediction:
That a constitutional privilege of the President is not absolute will
doubtless inspire attacks on traditionally absolute privileges: husbandwife, lawyer-client, doctor-patient, priest-penitent, and privileges-immunities of sovereigns and diplomats.
Henkin, Executive Privilege: Mr. Nixon Loses but the Presidency Largely Prevails, 22 UCLA L. REV. 40, 44 (1974).
See also Kurland, United States v.
Nixon: Who Killed Cock Robin?, 22 UCLA L. REV. 68, 73-74 (1974).
The
relevance of Nixon to legislative privilege is discussed in text accompanying notes
181-91 infra.
35 519 F.2d at 220 n.60.
36 Id. at 220-26. The Fifth Circuit, being unable to review the subpoenaed
testimony for itself, was content to rely on external circumstances to conclude
the material was probably not exculpatory. Thus, the court emphasized that the
witnesses whose congressional testimony was being sought had testified previously
on the same subjects, and that the defense had access to these statements. Id. at
221. See also Brief for Appellant at 139-42, Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184
(5th Cir. 1975), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 26, at 225-27. However, the
Fifth Circuit, in discussing the fifth amendment due process clause argument,
read Brady even more narrowly than the Ehrlichman court, stressing the importance of "the suppression by the prosecution" of "crucial, critical, highly significant" evidence. Id. at 223 (emphasis in original) & 221. See note 27 supra.
The court of appeals did not decide whether the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500
(1970), had been violated by Congress, but held that even if there had been such
a statutory violation, it was not of constitutional dimension and therefore did not
justify habeas corpus relief. 519 F.2d at 224-26.
Although the court did not explicitly discuss the sixth amendment right to
compulsory process and confrontation, its fifth amendment holding (resting in
part on the premise that the subpoenaed transcripts were cumulative) should be
dispositive on this point as well. See United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F.
Supp. 731 (S.D. Cal. 1952). The alternative-to hold that the right of com-

1977]

CONGRESSIONAL PAPERS

The court therefore held that the lower court erred in granting
the habeas corpus petition.
In treating the failure to produce subpoenaed transcripts of

closed congressional hearings as within the ambit of the publication clause, the lower courts in Calley and Ehrlichman were
plainly mistaken. 7 To begin with, reliance on this clause in these
cases is difficult to reconcile with a literal reading of the publication clause in its entirety. The clause directs the houses of Congress
to keep a complete "Journal," or record, of their "Proceedings"
and to publish this record, except for "such Parts as may in their
Hearings conducted by congresJudgment require secrecy." 3"
sional committees, whether open or closed to the public, are in-

disputably part of congressional proceedings."0

Hence, had the

issue in Calley and Ehrlichman been whether Congress was constitutionally obliged to insert verbatim transcripts of these proceedings in the Congressional Record, the publication clause would
have been controlling.4" However, the issue presented in Calley
and Ehrlichman was whether Congress had the power to refuse

to produce records of its proceedings subpoenaed for use in litigation. On its face, the publication clause gives Congress only
the power to determine that certain records of congressional proceedings should be omitted from the published journal. Nothing
in the wording of the clause gives Congress the power to block
4
other modes of publication or disclosure of its procedings.
pulsory process does not entitle a defendant to material that is unavailable by
reason of a valid exercise of privilege-would have required the court to pass
on the validity of the congressional assertion of privilege. See generally note 27
supra.
37 Their mistaken interpretation is not too surprising since none of the
parties in these cases offered any other construction of the clause to the courts,
see, e.g., Brief for Plaintiff at 108 n.88, United States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76
(D.C. Cir. 1976), and this aspect of the clause has received virtually no other
judicial attention. For cases concerned with other aspects of the clause, see
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 626 n.16 (1972); Wright v. United States,
302 U.S. 583, 588-89 (1938); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 683 n.8
(1929); United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S.
649 (1891).
38 See text accompanying note 17 supra.
39 Cf. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975)
(upholding investigatory powers of congressional committees); Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (same); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178 (1957) (same); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927) (same).
40 See text accompanying notes 48-51 infra.
41 The questionable assumption that the publication clause deals with all
forms of disclosure of congressional information also appears in Note, The CIA's
Secret Funding and the Constitution, 84 YALE L.J. 608, 624-25 (1975).
It is true that the secrecy exception to the publication clause could be used
to buttress the argument that Congress, like the executive, has an implied privilege over its papers based on a generalized interest in confidentiality or the more
specific interest in preserving national security secrets. This possibility is considered in text accompanying notes 229-42 infra.
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An examination of discussions of the clause during the
drafting and adoption of the Constitution confirms this interpretation of the clause. The clause was drafted to insure the publicity-not the secrecy-of congressional proceedings. 2 When
Oliver Ellsworth, a highly respected delegate from Connecticut,
suggested in frustration that the entire clause be stricken because the "legislature will not fail to publish its proceedings from
time to time,"'" James Wilson of Pennsylvania vigorously insisted: "The people have a right to know what their Agents are
doing or have done, and it should not be in the option of the
Legislature to conceal their proceedings."4 4 After the clause was
adopted in its present form by the Federal Convention, misgivings
continued to be expressed over the proposed constitution's failure
to require the legislature to publish all of its proceedings at regularly specified intervals. Ratification by the states was achieved
only after the antifederalists were assured by James Madison
and other influential members of the Convention that frequent
publication of the journal was required, 45 and that the secrecy
The authors of a recent article have commented:
The Framers also inserted a provision in the Constitution which
specifically overruled an important and controversial privilege. Since
1641, the House of Commons had a standing rule which forbade the
publication of its proceedings either by members or by the press, except
by specific leave of the House. This rule was originally justified as
insuring secrecy against monarchs who threatened retaliation against
members who were discovered to have intruded into their prerogatives
in parliamentary debates. But the rule was later invoked out of fear
of misrepresentation in the press and a general intolerance of public
criticism. The possibility that such a rule could be invoked by the new
Congress was inconsistent with the authors' theories of self-government,
which presupposed the existence of an informed electorate. In addition,
the Framers were appreciative of the effects on public opinion and on
government caused by publicizing the debates of the colonial assemblies.
They therefore placed in the Constitution a duty of Congress to inform
the public about its deliberations.
Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 16, at 1137-38 (footnotes omitted).
43 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
260 (1911).
42

44

Id. Immediately following Wilson's remarks, the framers approved the

publication clause in its present form by a vote of six to four. Id.
45 Consider, for example, the following exchange in the Virginia ratification
debate. When Patrick Henry contended that the expression "from time to time"
"admits of any extension" and "is too inexplicit and ambiguous to avail anything,"
3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES OF THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 170 (2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter cited as ELLIOT'S
DEBATES], Edmund Randolph, a Virginia delegate to the Federal Convention,
countered:
There is no clause in the Constitution of Virginia to oblige its legislature to publish its proceedings at any period. The clause in this Constitution which provides for a periodical publication . . . renders the
federal Constitution superior to that of Virginia in this respect. The
expression, from time to time, renders us sufficiently secure; it will
compel them to publish their proceedings as often as it can con-
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exception would be invoked only on extremely rare occasions.4 6
Thus, the debate surrounding the publication clause focused
entirely on the record that Congress is required to maintain and
release to the general public. Nowhere in the history of the
clause's enactment is there the slightest hint that the clause was
designed to free Congress from the duty to produce subpoenaed
documents needed in litigation. Given the aversion displayed by
the authors of the Constitution to secrecy in government, 47 it is
implausible that the discretion given Congress in the secrecy exception to the publication clause was meant to extend beyond the
content of the published journal of congressional proceedings.
There is a second, independent basis for the conclusion that
the lower courts in Calley and Ehrlichman erred in holding that
the subpoenaed transcripts were privileged under the publication
clause-the limited scope of the secrecy exception. Even if the
publication clause gave Congress the right not only to delete certain
material from its journal, but also to resist judicial subpoenas for
certain documents, Congress could decline to comply with only
those subpoenas that demanded the sort of information which
the secrecy exception was adopted to protect.
Those who framed and adopted the Constitution intended
that the secrecy exception would apply only to certain specific
types of congressional proceedings-principally the negotiation of
treaties and the planning of military operations in wartime.4"
veniently and safely be done: and it must satisfy every mind without
an illiberal perversion of its meaning.
Id. at 202.
40 See note 48 infra.
47 See, e.g., Berger, Executive Privilege v. CongressionalInquiry, 12 UCLA
L. REV. 1044, 1067-69 (1965).
48 In the Virginia ratification debates, John Marshall discussed the secrecy
exception in this way: "When debating on the propriety of declaring war, or on
military arrangements, do they deliberate in the open fields? No sir. . . . In this
plan, secrecy is used only when it would be fatal and pernicious to publish the
schemes of government." 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 45, at 233. See also
id. at 331 (Madison), 401 (Randolph), 404 (Mason), 409 (Madison), 459
(Mason), 460 (Madison and Mason).
Similarly, in the North Carolina Ratification Convention, Iredell explained:
[I]n time of war it was absolutely necessary to conceal the operations
of government; otherwise no attack on an enemy could be premeditated
with success . . . [and] it was no less imprudent to divulge our negotiations with foreign powers.
4 id. at 73. See also 2 id. at 52 (Gorham and Perley); 2 M. FARRAND, supra
note 43, at 613. But see I ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 45, at 330 (amendment proposed by New York explicitly limiting secrecy to "parts relating to
treaties or military operations," id.); id. at 336 (amendment proposed by Rhode
Island explicitly limiting secrecy to "parts . . . relating to treaties, alliances or
military operations"); 3 id. at 659-60 (similar amendment proposed by Virginia);
4 id. at 425 (similar amendment proposed by North Carolina); 2 M. FARRAND,
supra note 43, at 260.
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Thus the secrecy provision was not made more explicit4 9 only

because it was understood that it was limited in scope to "[s]uch
transactions as relate to military operations or affairs of great
consequence, the immediate promulgation of which might defeat

the interests of the community."50

Ratification debates revealed

the concern that the Federal Constitution should not allow the
new legislature to "cover with the veil of secrecy the common

routine of business."'"
The documents requested in Calley and Ehrlichman did not
fall within the scope of the secrecy exception thus defined. The
proceedings represented by the transcripts sought in these cases

were not of a sufficiently sensitive character. Congress was not
discussing military or diplomatic secrets which might jeopardize
national security if disclosed.

It was attempting to uncover facts

concerning past events which, although distressing,
were hardly
52

state secrets as the framers understood the concept.
Although the secrecy exception is of limited scope, Congress'
decision as to when to invoke the exception is arguably not
subject to challenge in court, for the clause entrusts the decision as to what merits secrecy to the houses of Congress "in their
Judgment." This argument is based on the "political question"
doctrine.5 3 Among other things, this doctrine precludes judicial
resolution of those matters which the text of the Constitution com411 See 2 M. FARRAND,supra note 43,
50 3 ELLIoT's DEBATES, supra note

at 613; note 48 supra.
45, at 170 (Henry). See also note 48

supra.
51 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 45, at 170 (Henry).
52 As the district court observed in Ehrlichnan, Howard Hunt's testimony
to the Intelligence Subcommittee "appears to have dealt, in part and long after
the events, with the intelligence community's role in the Fielding break-in."
Memorandum and Order, supra note 26, at 2. Perhaps, if the testimony had
exposed such United States intelligence operations abroad that public disclosure
might have caused interference in relations with foreign governments, it would
have met the test for suppression under the publication clause.
The testimony in Calley concerned the past activities of American military
forces abroad, but the mere fact that a matter touches on military operations or
foreign relations should not make it a state secret any more than the President's
power as Commander-in-Chief encompasses "anything . . .that can be done with
an army or navy." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 642
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
53 See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964); Scharpf, Judicial
Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517
(1966); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1959). Note that Professor Henkin has recently called for a rethinking of the "political question" doctrine, suggesting that it is "an unnecessary,
deceptive packaging of several established doctrines."
Henkin, Is There a
"PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 622 (1976).
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mits for decision to another branch of government. 4 The "in
their Judgment" portion of the publication clause seems a para-

digm of such a "textually demonstrable commitment."5"

If so,"

the propriety of decisions as to which of Congress' proceedings

require secrecy is a political question beyond the ken of the
courts." 7
Even if a court is precluded from reviewing congressional
judgments against publication,5 s however, such judgments are not
apodictically correct when measured against constitutional standards. That a court will not tell Congress it has made a constitutional error in invoking secrecy in a particular case does not
prevent other participants in the political and legal process from
doing so. In particular, it does not, and should not, stop individ54 According to one commentator, the "proper content" of the political
question doctrine consists of the following propositions:
1. The courts are bound to accept decisions by the political
branches within their constitutional authority.
2. The courts will not find limitations or prohibitions on the powers of the political branches where the Constitution does not prescribe
any.
3. Not all constitutional limitations or prohibitions imply rights
and standing to object in favor of private parties.
4. The courts may refuse some (or all) remedies for want of
equity.
5. In principle, finally, there might be constitutional provisions
which can properly be interpreted as wholly or in part "self-monitoring"
and not the subject of judicial review.
Henkin, supra note 53, at 622-23.
Indicative of its relative ob55 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
scurity among constitutional provisions, see note 37 & accompanying text supra,
the publication clause has not played even a supporting role in the debate on the
nature of the political question doctrine. Professor Wechsler's examples of
textual provisions creating political questions were the article I, section 5 provision
that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications
of its own Members," and the article I, section 3 language that the "Senate shall
have the sole Power to try all Impeachments." Wechsler, supra note 53, at 8-9.
56 Whether any clause in the Constitution amounts to a textual commitment
excluding judicial review is debatable. For an analysis of Wechsler's examples of
textual commitments, Wechsler, note 55 supra, which is readily applicable to the
publication clause, see Henkin, supra note 53, at 604-05. See also Roudebush v.
Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). But
see Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
57 It might be argued that a court may nonetheless ascertain whether Congress has applied the correct standards in deciding that a particular matter should
be kept secret. Such is the implication of Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
(1969), criticized in Sandalow, Comments on Powell v. McCormack, 17 UCLA
L. REV. 164, 172-74 (1969), but adopted in Note, Blacklisting Through the Publication of CongressionalReports, 81 YALE L.J. 188, 204 (1971). This argument
would allow judicial review of the grounds (e.g., is this information related to
foreign affairs?) but not the need (what effect would disclosure have on foreign
affairs?) for secrecy. See Henkin, supra note 53, at 605 n.26.
58 The political nature of the question does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction, but it does render the case nonjusticiable. See Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 512 (1969); A. BICKEL, supra note 53, at 125-26; Scharpf, note
53 supra. But see Wechsler, note 53 supra.
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ual legislators from making their decisions about the appropriateness of invoking secrecy in accordance with the proper constitutional conception of state secrets. 5
In sum, to the extent that congressional resistance to judicial
discovery is predicated on the publication clause, it is without
constitutional validity. Even in situations as yet unrealized,
where a record of congressional proceedings is subpoenaed" and
where the decision that this record not be published is consistent
with the constitutional scope of the secrecy exception of the publication clause, the clause does not absolve Congress of the responsibility to supply the information for use in litigation.
B.

The Immunity from Arrest Clause

Unlike the publication clause, the immunity from arrest
clause is not directly concerned with the confidentiality of congressional proceedings or papers. The clause reads: "They
[Senators and Representatives] shall, in all cases except Treason, Felony, and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from
arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective
Houses, and in going from and returning to the same.""' Thus
on its face, the immunity from arrest clause protects people, 62 not
59 See Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975). But see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 68 (1961).
And certainly the political question doctrine, or, more generally, any limitation on judicial review, need put no damper on professorial
criticism, or "scholarly kibitzing," as Professor Michelman would put it. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment,
83 HARv. L. REV. 7, 13 (1969).
60 Whatever privilege the publication clause supplies should be limited to

materials such as recordation of votes and debates on the floor or transcripts of
committee meetings, which qualify as records of "Proceedings" that might be
included in a "Journal." The privilege should not apply to all internal papers of
Congress, since not all papers in the possession of Congress record proceedings.
See note 8 supra.
61 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.

62 It protects a very limited number of people-"Senators and Representatives." The clause is inapposite to other persons, such as congressional aides or
employees. Significantly, the early British and colonial practice was otherwise.
By the early 18th century, the freedom from arrest privilege embraced not only
members but others as well: their servants and estates; officers of the whole
house acting in their official capacities; and "evidences," that is, persons called
to give testimony in an assembly hearing. A privilege from arrest, process, and
a wide range of other "molestations" was claimed for all these persons. See
generally United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 529 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); M. CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 98-119 (1943); 10 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 544-46
(1938); 1 T. MAY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 358 (1912); C.
WITTKE, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE 41-43 (1921);
Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 16, at 1137 n.128. By the late 18th century,
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papers. However, the availability of congressional papers to parties
engaged in litigation may ultimately depend upon the amenability
of legislative personnel to judicial orders. A subpoena duces

tecum, for instance, commands a particular person to appear in

court and to bring with him specifically identified materials.6 A
number of such subpoenas have been served on legislators and
have met with resistance apparently based on Congress' understanding of the immunity from arrest clause.6 4 Whether members
of Congress can validly claim that this clause immunizes them
from subpoenas or other judicial orders therefore warrants scrutiny.
In England and colonial America, members of Parliament
and the legislative assemblies were exempt from attending court
in any capacity, 5 and, for a time, the immunity from arrest clause
the very breadth of this immunity had bred popular dissatisfaction, leading the
framers to provide for freedom from arrest for "Senators and Representatives"
only. See note 93 infra.
In Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 613-15 (1972), the Court analyzed
a subpoena to a legislative aide as if it had been addressed to a legislator. However, in the context of the immunity from arrest clause, the Court made this
assumption solely for the purpose of argument and did not accept "the claim . . .
that a Member's aide shares the Member's constitutional privilege." Id. at 613.
With respect to the speech or debate clause, on the other hand, the Court held
that aides and assistants to a legislator "must be treated as the latter's alter egos."
Id. at 617. See notes 192-203 & accompanying text infra.
See, e.g.,
63 The subpoenaed material need not be a paper or document.
Ariz. Republic, Oct. 26, 1976, § B, at 1, col. 3 (subpoena duces tecum calling for
production of a dog).
64 See, e.g., Congressional Papers, supra note 1, at 59-60, 68-69 & 74-75.
Congress has taken the same position with respect to subpoenas commanding
legislators to testify but not demanding the production of documents. See, e.g., id.
at 59 n.14; H.R. Res. 956, 122 CONG. REC. H6 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1976); H.R.
Res. 892, 121 id. at H11550 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1975); S. Res. 183, id. at S10640
(daily ed. June 13, 1975). The inaction of the House in the face of a subpoena to
Fiorella La Guardia in 1926 is one of the more celebrated cases. When subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, La Guardia informed the House that the
subpoena invaded privileged territory and intimated that the House should not
grant him permission to comply with the subpoena. 6 C. CANNON, PRECEDENTS
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

§ 586, at 825 (1936).

In bringing the

matter to the attention of the House, La Guardia was following established practice and adhering to the principle that where a privilege exists it may not be
waived without the consent of the House. See Congressional Papers, supra note
1, at 60-61. The House acquiesced in La Guardia's suggestion, and La Guardia
apparently did not testify. 6 C. CANNON, supra at 825. See Nixon v. Sirica, 487
F.2d 700, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
65 The following is an account of the English and colonial practice:
The House of Commons was especially resentful if its members were
called to jury duty, or subpoenas were served upon them, or they were
made defendants in civil suits. In the colonies, also, anything of this
sort which distracted a member's attention from his duties or tended to
divide his time was counted as a violation of privilege. If an assemblyman was called to court as a defendant, witness, or attorney without
first gaining the consent of the house to which he belonged, the honor
and dignity of the assembly was supposed to be impaired. This was
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Both Thomas

Jefferson and Joseph Story, for example, had no doubt that
"[t]his privilege from arrest, privileges, of course, against all
process the disobedience to which is punishable by an attachment
of the person, as a subpoena ad respondendum or testificandum,
or a summons on a jury,"6 and many early cases reflected their
67
view.

The United States Supreme Court, however, did not begin
to define the dimensions of the privilege until more than 120
years after the framing of the Constitution. The first step was
taken in Williamson v. United States.6 s John Williamson, a
member of the House of Representatives, had been convicted of

conspiring to suborn perjury in connection with the purchase of
land by the federal government.

As the court was about to pro-

not merely a whim on the part of the house, but was also recognized
outside that body.
M. CLARKE, supra note 62, at 109-10. See also T. JEFFERSON, MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACnCE § III, in Senate Manual, S. Doc. No. 1, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 586-87 (1975); 1 T. COOLEY, supra note 11, at 273-75; L. LABAREE, ROYAL
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 204 (1930); Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 16,
at 1122 n.46, 1137 n.128.
66 T. JEFFERSON, supra note 65, at 588; 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 857, at 325 (Boston 1833).
See also
L. CUSHING, LAW AND PRACrICE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES § 598, at 241 (2d
ed. 1866).
67 The early cases are collected in 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 2371, at 753 n.5 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Upon an examination of these cases, Wigmore concluded that although the immunity from arrest
clause "still admits of some question," it has been interpreted as a complete
exemption "from attending court in any capacity." Id. at 753. See, e.g., Gyer's
Lessee v. Irwin, 4 Dall. 107 (Pa. 1790), where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
unanimously announced in dictum that "[a] member of the general assembly is,
undoubtedly, privileged from arrest, summons, citation, or other civil process,
during his attendance on the public business confided to him." Id. at 107. But
see United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 626 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,861). In
Cooper, the defendant, who had been indicted for seditious libel on President
Adams, sought to have various members of Congress testify in his behalf. State
courts in Pennsylvania followed the practice of addressing letters, rather than
subpoenas, to legislators. Cooper asked the federal court to write such a letter
in his behalf to several members of Congress. Justice Chase agreed, seeing no
reason to accord the federal legislators this perquisite:
The constitution gives to every man, charged with an offence, the
benefit of compulsory process, to secure the attendance of his witnesses. I do not know of any privilege to exempt members of congress
from the service, or the obligations of a subpoena, in such cases. I
will not sign any letter of the kind proposed. If, upon service of a
subpoena, the members of congress do not attend, a different question
may arise; and it will then be time enough to decide, whether an attachment ought, or ought not, to issue. It is not a necessary consequence of non-attendance, after the service of a subpoena, that an
attachment shall issue. A satisfactory reason may appear to the court
to justify or excuse it.
Id. at 626.
68 207 U.S. 425 (1908).
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nounce sentence, Williamson protested that his term of office had
not yet expired and that the immunity from arrest clause therefore
precluded his imprisonment. Unpersuaded, the trial court
sentenced the congressman to ten months in prison. On appeal,
the Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the privilege from
arrest applies to a sentence of imprisonment which would prevent
a legislator from attending a session of Congress, 9 but that the
qualifying phrase concerning "Treason, Felony, and Breach of the
Peace" makes the grant of immunity inapplicable to all criminal
cases, even those not involving an overt public disturbance or act
of violence.7" After Williamson, it was clear that the arrest privilege does not make congressmen immune from arrest, prosecution,
71
or sentencing as defendants in criminal cases.
Controversy over the scope of immunity from civil process
continued after Williamson. In Long v. Ansell, 7" the Supreme
Court made the first major inroad on the early position that the
clause confers on legislators a blanket exemption from civil process. Named as a defendant in a libel action filed in the District
of Columbia, Senator Huey P. Long of Louisiana moved to quash
the summons on the theory that "the summons and service thereof
is invalid and of no legal effect whatsoever because in violation
of Article I, Section 6, Clause 1, of the Constitution. '7'
The Supreme Court was not impressed. Mr. Justice Brandeis, writing
for a unanimous Court, disposed of the constitutional question in
a terse, three-page opinion. Without adverting to the policies
underlying the immunity from arrest clause, 74 the opinion asserted
that the clause's "language is exact and leaves no room for
[another] construction. 75 Numerous cases interpreting the clause
along the lines suggested by Jefferson and Story were dismissed
as resting "largely upon doubtful notions as to the historic
privileges of members of Parliament before the enactment in
69 Id. at 434.
70 The Court found that the expression "treason, felony, and breach of the

peace" was drawn from the English practice, and that "the words were used in
England for the very purpose of excluding all crimes from the operation of the
parliamentary privilege." Id. at 438.
71 Imprisonment of congressmen convicted of criminal offenses is quite
rare, however. When Idaho representative George Hansen was ordered to serve
two months in prison following his conviction for violations of federal campaign
financing laws, he became the first sitting congressman to go to prison in 20
years. Wall St. J., Apr. 21, 1975, at 1, col. 3.
72 293 U.S. 76 (1934).
73 Id. at 81.
74 The plaintiff in the libel suit emphasized how "disturbingly, strange and
foreign" it would be to read the clause as a "senatorial prerogative that places
the personal wrongs done by a Senator to a private citizen beyond the effective
reach of the law." Id. at 79.
75 Id. at 82.
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1770 of the statute of 10 George III, c. 50.'6 This statute,
Justice Brandeis explained, declared that members of Parliament
were subject to process as defendants in civil cases, provided that
they were not "arrested or imprisoned. ' 77 Thus, according to
Justice Brandeis' interpretation, the English privilege at the time
of the framing of the Constitution protected legislators from civil
arrest, the antiquated technique of initiating a civil case by physically restraining the defendant,7 but did not afford any protection from service of a summons. The privilege as written into
the Constitution, the Court concluded, supplies this same protection from civil arrest, but does not bar effective service of a
summons on a senator or representative. 9
Neither Williamson, which established the amenability of a
legislator to criminal charges and punishment, nor Long, which
held that a congressman is susceptible to civil suit, dealt specifically with the claim of legislative immunity from serving as a witness in a civil or criminal case." ° The possibility of legislative
76

Id.

Id. at 82-83. Blackstone mentions four other statutes enacted to curtail
parliamentary privilege from arrest. Two of them, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 3 (1700)
and 11 Geo. 2, c. 24 (1738), limited the immunity to the period in which parliament is in session plus a fortnight after adjournment. The other two were
weaker versions of 10 Geo. 3, c. 50 (1769). One, 4 Geo. 3, c. 33 (1764),
permitted service of process for debt on members who were also merchants, and
the other, 2 & 3 Ann., c. 18 (1703), allowed suits for any misdemeanor or breach
of trust in a public office. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 165.
78 When the Constitution was adopted, arrests in civil suits were still common in America. 293 U.S. at 83. This provisional remedy of civil arrest, although no longer commonly pursued, is still allowed in certain circumstances in
many states. See, e.g., 7B N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 6101 (McKinney 1963); OR.
REV. STAT. § 29.510 (1975). The grounds for such arrest vary widely. See
77

N.Y. ADVISORY COMM. ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES, THIRD PRELIMINARY REIn some jurisdictions, an equitable writ of ne eyeat may
PORT 797-805 (1959).

also be used to prevent a defendant from fleeing the jurisdiction. See, e.g., United
States v. Shaheen, 445 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1971); National Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Queck, 1 Ariz. App. 595, 405 P.2d 905 (1965). Another sort of arrest not part
of the process of initiating a criminal accusation is the confinement of material
witnesses in criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d
933 (9th Cir. 1971); Carlson, Jailing the Innocent: The Plight of the Material
Witness, 55 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1969).
79 For a recent instance of a civil suit against a congressman, see, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Hollander v. Clay, 420 F. Supp. 853 (D.D.C. 1976) (no
constitutional or statutory bar to suit under False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 231
et seq. (1970), for allegedly false or inflated travel vouchers filed by representative).
80 There is language in Long to the effect that immunity from arrest means
no more than immunity from civil arrest as defined above. However, this description of the clause, which goes back to Williamson, see 293 U.S. at 83, occurs
in the context of a suit in which Senator Long was named as a defendant. The
statute of 10 Geo. 3, c. 50, which the Court cited in Long to delineate the limits
of the immunity, was enacted to make members of the British parliament liable
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witness immunity was first discussed-although somewhat superficially-in Gravel v. United States."'

Gravel arose from a

grand jury investigation of the release and publication of the
"Pentagon Papers. '"82 When the grand jury subpoenaed an assistant to Senator Gravel to testify about allegations that Gravel
or his staff had arranged for the papers to be published, the
Senator intervened, seeking to quash the subpoena as violative of
his privilege under the speech or debate clause. 8 Although no

claim under the immunity from arrest clause was raised, the Court
discussed that clause because it felt that the scope of the arrest

privilege in some way helped mark the contours of the speech or

debate privilege.8 4 For analytical purposes, the Court treated the
The Court stated that
assistant as a member of the Senate. s

"[h]istory reveals, and prior cases so hold, that [the immunity from
arrest clause] exempts Members from arrest in civil cases only.""6
Since the grand jury subpoena did not constitute an "arrest" in
a "civil case, ' 8 7 the Senator and, a fortiori, his aide, had no protection by virtue of the immunity from arrest clause. In general,
the Court declared, the clause does not "confer immunity on a
Member from service of process as . . . a witness in a criminal case." s
to suit, but not necessarily to subpoena. Nor did other curative legislation enacted
in England before the adoption of the Constitution curtail this aspect of the parliamentary privilege from arrest. See 10 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 62, at
546-47; note 77 supra; note 91 infra.
Since Senator Gravel himself was not subpoenaed,
81 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
the Court's comments on the immunity from arrest clause were, in one sense,
mere dicta. See note 62 supra.
92 "Pentagon Papers" was the name given to a classified Defense Department study entitled "History of United States Decision-Making Process on Viet
Nam Policy." Anthony Russo and Daniel Ellsberg were ultimately indicted on
charges relating to the dissemination of the study, but the indictment, reprinted in
W. BISHIN & C. STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE AND ETHics 1179-80 (1972), was dismissed as a result of a government-inspired search of Ellsberg's psychiatrist's
office. See United States v. Russo, No. 9373-CD (C.D. Cal. 1973), May 11,
1973, Tr. at 22,690; G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 1331 n.* (9th ed. 1975).
83 The Court's treatment of the speech or debate issue is examined in notes
112-27, 146, 161-72 & accompanying text infra.
84 The Court's reasoning as to the relationship between the arrest privilege
and the privilege of speech or debate, which also appears in United States v.
Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 521 (1972), has been roundly criticized. Reinstein &
Silverglate, supra note 16, at 1139 n.139.
85 See note 62 supra.
86 408 U.S. at 614.
87 It is not clear whether the Court was relying on the absence of an
"arrest," or the absence of a "civil case," or both. A subpoena is a form of
civil process. A grand jury inquiry is a criminal proceeding. The opinion seems
to emphasize the latter fact, making it appear that the freedom from arrest
privilege does not pertain to a grand jury subpoena because a criminal, rather
than a civil, case is involved. See note 91 infra.
88 408 U.S. at 614-15.
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This reasoning can easily be extended to dispose of any
putative immunity from appearing as a witness in a civil case. If,
as Gravel seems to say, the privilege of freedom from arrest is
to be defined 9as narrowly as possible-to include no more than
"civil arrest,"" the historical antecedent of a summons to a civil
defendant-it follows that the privilege erects no obstacle to civil
discovery orders.
Yet, to move from a legislator's lack of immunity as a de-

fendant to his amenability to process as a witness in a criminal
or civil case requires a major step.9 ° Contrary to the assertion
in Gravel, neither "history" nor "prior cases" dictate that it must
be taken. The precedents are simply inconclusive. 9
As for
See note 80 supra; note 91 infra.
Different interests are implicated in each case. A privilege against serving as a witness, while significant in its own right, is not of the same order of
magnitude as a privilege absolving a public official of responsibility for criminal
or civil wrongdoing. Moreover, there are salient differences between appearances
in criminal and civil cases. Compare Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir.
1973), with Senate Select Comm. on Pres. Campaign Acts v. Nixon, 498 F.2d
725 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See Karst & Horowitz, Presidential Prerogative and Judicial Review, 22 UCLA L. REv. 47, 65 (1974).
For example, the possibility of
abuse-of litigation being manufactured as a vehicle to obtain congressional
papers-seems greater in civil suits by private parties.
91 See, e.g., I D. WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 314
(1910); note 67 supra. To support the pronunciamento concerning history and
prior cases, Justice White's majority opinion in Gravel reproduces snippets of
the opinions in Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76 (1934), and Williamson v. United
States, 207 U.S. 425 (1908).
But the language in these opinions relating to
"arrests in civil cases" occurs in the context of suits naming congressmen
as
defendants. These cases contain no dicta, let alone any holdings, regarding
legislative immunity from subpoena. See note 80 supra.
Having advanced the proposition that the immunity from arrest clause applies
solely to "arrests in civil cases" without explaining what this phrase means in
terms of the precedents cited, Justice White then states the corollary that
"freedom from arrest [does not] confer immunity on a Member from service of
process . . . as a witness in a criminal case." 408 U.S. at 614-15. The opinion
offers three justifications for this conclusion. First, it quotes the circuit court's
disavowal in United States v. Cooper of the existence of "any privilege to exempt
members of congress from the service, or the obligations, of a subpoena, in such
cases." 25 F. Cas. 626 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,861) (Chase, J., sitting on
Circuit), quoted in 408 U.S. at 615. However, the Court in Gravel shows no
awareness of Justice Chase's intimation in Cooper that a congressman, although
subject to service of a subpoena, might properly decline to appear as ordered.
See note 67 supra. Second, the Gravel opinion states, relying on Williamson and
Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906), a dubiously related case, "riut is,
therefore, sufficiently plain that the constitutional freedom from arrest does not
exempt Members of Congress from the operation of the ordinary criminal laws,
even though imprisonment may prevent or interfere with the performance of their
duties as Members." 408 U.S. at 615. The holding in Williamson-that a legislator may be tried for a criminal offense-is explicitly provided for in the Constitution, and thus is "sufficiently plain." But what this tells us about the obligation
of a member of Congress to appear as a third-party witness rather than to stand
trial for his own criminal act is not explained. Finally, the opinion disingenuously cites Jefferson for "the judgment that legislators ought not to stand above
89
90
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history, the most that can be said is that the records of the drafting
and inclusion of the immunity from arrest clause, from the Articles
of Confederation through the ratification of the Constitution, do
not reveal any firm intent to afford legislators a general immunity
from process,92 and that the general attitude that prevailed toward
legislative freedom from arrest in 1787 suggests that no sweeping
immunity was intended. 93 To discern the limits of the privilege
that was granted, it therefore becomes necessary to consider the
policies that induced the authors of the Constitution to provide
explicitly for an arrest privilege. Two competing concerns seem
to have influenced the framers.94 On the one hand, they did not
wish to see legislators abandon their duties to their constituents
as a result of being forced to attend possibly distant courts while
their houses were in session. Jefferson, voicing this concern in
the manual of parliamentary procedure he prepared for the first
Congress, went so far as to state that "the enormous disparity of
[this] evil admits of no comparison." 95 On the other hand, those
the law they create but ought generally to be bound by it as are ordinary persons."
Id., citing T. JEFFERSON, supra note 65, at 587. Justice White makes no mention
of Jefferson's unqualified rejection of the conclusion that legislators are amenable
to subpoena even though Jefferson's thoughts on this precise issue are stated only
two paragraphs after Jefferson's more general judgment. See id. at 588-89; T.
JEFFERSON, supra note 65, at 480; text accompanying note 66 supra.
92 See the Court's discussion of the history of the clause in Williamson v.
United States, 207 U.S. 425, 436-38 (1908). It would have been easy enough
for the framers to provide unequivocally for such an immunity. Cf., e.g., CAL.
CONsT. art. 4, § 14 (1966) ("A member of the Legislature is not subject to civil
process during a session of the Legislature or for five days before and after a
session").
93 By the late 18th century, parliamentary privileges, particularly freedom
from arrest, had been so abused that a strong counterreaction had set in. See,
e.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. .501, 546 (1972) (dissenting opinion);
Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76, 82-83 (1934); M. CLARKE, supra note 62, at 85;
Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 16, at ,1137 n.128; Comment, Brewster, Gravel
and Legislative Immunity, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 125, 127 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Legislative Immunity]; note 77 supra. Thus, despite the colonial belief that
"the legislative assembly [is] the natural friend of liberty," E. CORWIN, THE
PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, at 5-6 (4th ed. 1957); see Berger,
supra note 47, at 1070 n.132, the framers took pains to withhold from the national
legislature the broad, undefined privileges that had prevailed in the colonies. See,
e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued to Richard M. Nixon, 360
F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C.), mandamus denied sub nom. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d
700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
94 The arrest clause, unlike the publication clause, provoked little controversy which would illuminate these concerns. In fact, in 1800, Charles Pinckney,
a delegate to the federal convention of 1787, declared that "[tihe remainder of
the clause respecting privilege is so express on the subjects of privilege from
arrest, government of members, and expulsion, that every civil officer in the
United States, and every man who has the least knowledge, cannot misunderstand
them." 10 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 72 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1800), reprinted in
3 M. FARRAND, supra note 43, at 384.
95 The context of this statement is as follows:
This privilege from arrest, privileges, of course, against all process
the disobedience to which is punishable by an attachment of the person,
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who drafted and ratified the Constitution were also sensitive to
the importance to our system of justice, civil as well as criminal,
of obtaining relevant evidence from all persons, regardless of their
rank and station in life.9"
The arrest clause best accommodates these two interests if it

is interpreted as preventing unnecessary detentions and distractions resulting from civil arrest, while permitting service of
process on all defendants or witnesses in criminal or civil litigation.
If this seems a narrow construction of the privilege, it should be
remembered that the problem of interference with legislative proas a subpoena ad respondendum, or testificandurn, or a summons on a
jury; and with reason, because a member has superior duties to perform
in another place. When a Representative is withdrawn from his seat
by summons, the 40,000 people whom he represents lose their voice in
debate and vote, as they do on his voluntary absence; when a Senator
is withdrawn by summons, his State loses half its voice in debate and
vote, as it does on his voluntary absence. The enormous disparity of
evil admits of no comparison.
T. JEFFERSON, supra note 65, at 588-89. See also 4 CONG. REc. 1530 (1876)
(debate on Belknap subpoena):
[A] Representative who represents a large body of people, or a Senator
who represents a State, should not be called by the courts at their
pleasure to leave their seats. He holds superior allegiance. If it were
otherwise, might we not be left without a quorum here? . . .

Public

duty is paramount to all your police courts and with all their attachments and subpoenas duces tecum.
Id. The concern that the people of a state or district would be deprived of their
voice and vote in Congress was properly more acute earlier in our history when
travel was more time-consuming and legislative sessions were shorter.
96 As Pinckney explained, "they never meant that the body who ought to
be the purest, and the least in want of shelter from the operation of laws equally
affecting all their fellow citizens, should be able to avoid them .......
10
ANNALS OF CONG.. 72 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1800), reprinted in 3 M. FARRAND,

supra note 43, at 385.
On the same day as the decision in Gravel, the Supreme Court held, in
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), that the first amendment did not protect newspaper reporters from demands by a grand jury to reveal the sources of
information given them in confidence. Relying on the "longstanding principle
'that the public . . . has a right to every man's evidence,'" id. at 688 (citations
omitted), the Court quoted Jeremy Bentham's vivid illustration of the importance
of the need for relevant evidence to the fair administration of the civil justice
system:
Are men of the first rank and consideration-are men high in
office-men whose time is not less valuable to the public than to themselves-are such men to be forced to quit their business, their functions,
and what is more than all, their pleasure, at the beck of every idle or
malicious adversary, to dance attendance on every petty cause? Yes, as
far as it is necessary, they and everybody .

. .

.

Were the Prince of

Wales, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the High Lord Chancellor,
to be passing by in the same coach while a chimney-sweeper and a
barrow-woman were in dispute about a halfpennyworth of apples, and
the chimney-sweeper or barrow-woman were to think it proper to call
upon them for their evidence, could they refuse it? No, most certainly.
Id. at 688 n.26, quoting 4 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 320-21 (J. Bowring

ed. 1843). But cf. Cox, supra note 2, at 1417 (suggesting that the interest in
production of evidence in civil cases in which a claim of executive privilege is
raised is less weighty than that in criminal cases); Karst & Horowitz, supra note
90, at 65 (same).
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ceedings can be ameliorated without throwing a blanket immunity
from process around Congress. 9 7 Moteover, as Wigmore taught,
97 The question of amenability to subpoena can be treated separately from
the issue of what constitutes compliance. See J. WIGMORE, supra note 67,
§ 2370(c), at 748 (distinguishing between testimonial and viatorial immunity).
The appearance can be delayed, if need be, until the House is in recess. See
United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 626 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,861).
In some instances, the testimony might be secured by deposition or interrogatories.
See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 67, § 2371(d), at 749. Cf. United States v. Burr,
25 F. Cas. 187, 191 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694) (President may under
certain circumstances be deposed).
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972), and Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S.
76 (1934), do not directly address the question whether special arrangements
should or must be made to minimize interference with a congressman's attendance at his house, although Gravel does cite Justice Chase's opinion in United
States v. Cooper, supra, with approval, 408 U.S. at 615. See note 67 supra.
Gravel and Long also do not consider whether a subpoena to a congressman
may be enforced by a contempt citation. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 692 (1974) (ordering the President to comply with a subpoena notwithstanding the recognition that the "issue whether a President can be cited for
contempt could itself engender protracted litigation"); Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486, 517 (1969) (declaratory judgment requested, rather than coercive
relief). Thus, the majority' opinion in Gravel states only that the freedom from
arrest privilege does not "confer immunity on a Member from service of process
as . . . a witness in a criminal case." 408 U.S. at 614-15 (emphasis added).
Still, the opinion strongly suggests that legislators are no more immune from
the "obligations" of a subpoena than they are from service of process. Id. at
615. Furthermore, the logic of Gravel in narrowing the protection of the immunity from arrest clause to freedom from arrest as a defendant in a civil suit
implies that even imprisonment for civil contempt is not constitutionally offensive.
The argument against permitting legislators to be held in contempt while
their house is in session rests on the same ground as the argument against requiring legislators to testify-to do so would deprive the voters of their elected
representative. The argument carries more weight here, however, because a
recalcitrant legislator could conceivably find himself imprisoned for contempt for
an extended period of time. Related concerns about the traditional remedy of
coercive contempt have led courts to be highly circumspect in granting effective
relief against executive officials. See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F.2d 124
(7th Cir. 1972).
Even if the concern for the electorate is perceived as compelling in this
context, it does not establish that members of Congress are outside the reach of
the contempt power. First, imprisonment is not the only form of coercive, civil
contempt. Salaries may be withheld, or daily fines imposed. See, e.g., 0. Fiss,
INJUNCTIONS 739-59 (1972).
Second, even if imprisonment is found to be necessary in a particular instance, a recalcitrant congressman's sentence could be
suspended until his house is no longer in session. Cf. Jencks v. Goforth, 57 N.M.
627, 261 P.2d 655 (1,953) (suspended sentence of imprisonment of union official
for violation of injunction).
A legislator who desires to contest the validity of a subpoena directed to
him as a third party need not risk a contempt citation to secure judicial review.
He may move to quash the subpoena, and, if need be, he may obtain appellate
review by mandamus. See, e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. at 608 n.1;
McSurely v. McClellan, 521 F.2d 1024, 1032 n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff'd en banc
by an equally divided vote, 45 U.S.L.W. 2311 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21, 1976). Cf.
United States v. Nixon, supra at 691-92 (granting appellate review of claim of
executive privilege prior to enforcement proceeding); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d
700, 706-07 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (same).
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privileges against forced disclosures, whether "established in the
Constitution, by statute, or at common law," are "exceptions to the

demand for every man's evidence" and "are not lightly created
nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search

for truth. '9 8 The conclusion and implications of Gravel are thus
essentially correct.
In short, the immunity enjoyed by legislators should be confined to the immunity from civil arrest spoken of in Long and
Gravel. Legislators are amenable to process, both as defendants
and witnesses in criminal and civil cases. Consequently, the

immunity from arrest clause is not a barrier to judicial discovery
of congressional papers.
C.

The Speech or Debate Clause
The speech or debate clause states that "for any Speech or

Debate in either House, they [Senators and Representatives] shall
not be questioned in any other Place." 99 Despite numerous
cases °° and copious commentary'' interpreting the clause, its
relationship to subpoenas for congressional papers remains largely
unexplored. 10 As the wording of the clause suggests, in order
to ascertain whether it protects any or all congressional papers'
98 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-10 (1974) (footnote omitted).
See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 67, § 2192, at 70. See also United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9 (1973); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 668 (1972); Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Blackmer
v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273,
281 (1919).
99 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 3.
100 The most recent Supreme Court decisions are Eastland v. United States
Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973);
United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); Gravel v. United States, 408
U.S. 606 (1972); Powell v. McCormack, 39.5 U.S. 486 (1969); Dombrowski v.
Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
101 See, e.g., authorities cited in Congressional Papers, supra note 1, at 59
n.12; Cella, The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Speech or Debate: The New
Interpretation as a Threat to Legislative Coequality, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1019
(1974); Suarez, CongressionalImmunity: A Criticism of Existing Distinctions and
a Proposalfor a New Definitional Approach, 20 VILL. L. REV. 97 (1974); Veeder,
Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Legislative and Executive Proceedings, 10
COLUM. L. REV. 131 (1910); Yankwich, The Immunity of Congressional SpeechIts Origin, Meaning and Scope, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 960 (.1,951); 46 Miss. L.J.
1112 (1975); 41 Mo. L. REV. 108 (1976).
102 The federal district court for the District of Columbia has considered
the issue in two recent cases, United States v. Ehrlichman, Crim. No. 74-116
(D.D.C. July 3, 1974), aff'd in part, 44 U.S.L.W. 2543 (D.C. Cir. May 17, 1976),
petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1976), and Common
Cause v. Bailar, Civ. No. 1887-73 (D.D.C., filed Oct. 5, 1973). The memoranda
and orders in these cases dealing with the speech or debate clause barrier to the
discovery of congressional papers are discussed in notes 128 & 157 infra. See also
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 499 n.13 (1975).
103 See note 8 supra.
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from judicial discovery, it is necessary to define the type of "questioning" to which the clause applies, the nature of the "speech or
debate" that is protected from such questioning, and how the
clause operates in the context of subpoenas to legislative aides and
employees.'
1.

What Constitutes Questioning?

The historical background of the speech or debate clause
suggests that, at the very least, the "questioning" prohibited by
the clause includes attempts to impose criminal liability on legislators for their legislative acts. 10 It was this form of questioning
which led to enaciment of the provision in the English Bill of
Rights of 1688 for freedom of speech, debate and proceedings
in Parliament' 6-the prefigurement of the article I privilege.'0 7
Cognizant of this history, the Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that the "central role" of the speech or debate clause is
"to prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive and
accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary." 10 8 Accordingly,
the Court has invariably treated criminal accusations of legislators
as the type of questioning that triggers the application of the
speech or debate clause.0 9
104 Of course, this last factor is only relevant if a member of Congress is
not the individual subpoenaed to produce the papers. In practice, most subpoenas duces tecum are directed to file clerks or other employees. See Congressional Papers,supra note 1, at 61-68, 70-71, 73-74.
105 Only questioning "for any Speech or Debate" is prohibited by the clause.
Thus the clause provides immunity from criminal charges for only certain types of
activities by legislators, referred to in text as "legislative acts." For a more
complete discussion of the types of activities protected, see text at notes 129-91
infra. For a discussion of the general lack of immunity from criminal penalties
for nonlegislative acts, see text at notes 61-98 supra.
106 The English privilege was the product of a century-long battle between
Parliament and the Tudor and Stuart monarchs, who sought to punish Parliament
members for "seditious" and "licentious" speech against the Crown. See, e.g.,
Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 16, at 1120-40; Cella, The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Freedom of Speech and Debate: Its Past, Present and Future as
a Bar to Criminal Prosecutions in the Courts, 2 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1, 3-16 (1968);
Yankwich, supra note 101, at 961-66; Veeder, supra note 101, at 131-40. As
formulated in the English Bill of Rights of 1688, the Act states that "the freedom
of speech, and debates or proceedings in parliament, ought not to be impeached
or questioned in any court or place out of parliament." An Act for Declaring
the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession of the Crown,
1 W. & M., sess. 2, c. 2, § 1 (1688).
107 See authorities cited in note 106 supra.
108 United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181 (1966), quoted in Eastland
v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502 (1975); Doe v. McMillan,
412 U.S. 306, 311 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 617 (1972).
109 E.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); United States v.
Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (.1966). See note 105 supra.
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However, the Supreme Court has not confined the meaning
of questioning to this indisputable core. Reasoning that the essential purpose of the clause is to foster "the uninhibited discharge

of [the] legislative duty,"' 110 the Court has consistently held that
the clause also relieves legislators from the burden of defending

their legislative activities against civil complaints initiated by
private parties.' 11
Whether the protection against questioning provided in the
speech or debate clause extends beyond attempts to impose civil

or criminal penalties on legislators is not clear.

One of the few

2
cases to address this issue is Gravel v. United States.'"

Gravel

arose not from a criminal or civil suit naming a legislator as a
defendant, but from a subpoena for testimony. Senator Gravel
had convened a night meeting of the Subcommittee on Buildings
and Grounds, of which he was chairman, and had placed most of
3
the forty-seven volumes of the Pentagon Papers" in the public

record.

As noted earlier,"' a grand jury, investigating an allega-

tion that Gravel had arranged for the classified study to be published by Beacon Press, subpoenaed an aide to the senator."'
Senator Gravel intervened, and the Supreme Court held on appeal
116
that the inquiry could proceed, but only within certain limits.

Although the Court was sharply divided over other matters," '
apparently none of the justices doubted that requiring a senator or
his aide"' to respond to grand jury interrogation about the sena-

tor's legislative activity was a species of questioning under the
speech or debate clause.

110 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951).
111 See, e.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491,
502-03 (1975). But see Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 16, at 1172 (suggesting that the line of cases treating immunity from private actions as constitutionally
based is "ripe for rethinking"). With respect to both executive-motivated actions
and private civil suits, the clause has never been read so broadly that legislators
are "absolved of the responsibility of filing a motion to dismiss." 42-1 U.S. at
511 n.17, quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 505 n.25 (1969).
112
113

408 U.S. 606 (1972).
See note 82 supra.

See text accompanying notes 81-88 supra.
115 The grand jury's inquiry related to the possible crimes connected with
the acquisition and dissemination of the Pentagon Papers. See note 82 supra.
116 See note 165 & accompanying text infra.
117 The Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist joined
in Justice White's opinion for the Court. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Douglas and Marshall, filed a dissenting opinion; Justices Douglas and Stewart
wrote individual dissenting opinions as well. Disagreement centered on which.
of Senator Gravel's alleged activities in connection with the Pentagon Papers
should have been considered legislative acts immune from probing by the grand
jury. See, e.g., note 173 infra.
118 See text accompanying notes 192-203 infra.
114
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The Court's assumption that the type of questioning prohibited in the speech or debate clause includes grand jury sub-

poenas for testimony seems justified. The policy behind the prohibition is not limited to the imposition of sanctions. Typically

initiated, directed and dominated by the executive branch,1 9 grand
jury interrogations may intimidate legislators and strike near the
120
heart of the'clause's protections.
Moreover, the implication of the Court's holding in Gravel is

that demands for testimony in civil litigation should also fall
within the sphere of the questioning prohibited by the speech or
debate clause. 121 Whether the questions are asked in front of a
grand jury or posed, instead, before a petit jury122 in a civil case,
questioning literally takes place. More importantly, the generalized concern for the uninhibited discharge of the legislative

duty123 applies to any judicial proceeding-criminal or civil-that
4
seeks an explanation of legislative speech or debate.'1

119 See, e.g., Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
174 (1973); Tigar & Levy, The Grand Jury as the New Inquisition, 50 MICH. ST.
B.J. 693 (1971); Comment, Federal Grand Jury Investigations of Political Dissidents, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 432 (1972); 2 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 88, 90
(1966). Of course, there have been "runaway" grand juries, e.g., In re Presentment of Special Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 1969, 315 F. Supp. 662 (D. Md.
1970), and the federal grand jury has been described as "a constitutional fixture
in its own right, legally independent of the Executive." Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d
700, 712 n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
120 See text accompanying notes 108 & 110 supra. Had the framers meant to
forbid only the imposition of sanctions for legislative speech or debate, they
could have followed the example of several state constitutions which provided
that "deliberation, speech or debate . . . cannot be the foundation of any accusation or prosecution, action or complaint, in any court or place whatsoever."
MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 21 (1784).
The choice of the broad term "questioned
in any other place" in the clause suggests that the privilege was meant to reach
questioning in front of a grand jury.
121 Lower courts have assumed that examination of witnesses in civil cases
may constitute "questioning" within the meaning of the speech or debate clause.
See McSurely v. McClellan, 521 F.2d 1024, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff'd en banc
by an equally divided vote, 45 U.S.L.W. 2311 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21, 1976) (interrogatories, depositions and civil trial); Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1332
(E.D. Pa. 1975) (dictum) (deposition). Cf. Common Cause v. Bailar, Civ. No.
1887-73 (D.D.C., filed Oct. 5, 1973) (Memoranda & Orders of July 30, 1975 and
Mar. 1, 1976) (production of documentary evidence), reprinted in part in JOINT
COMM. ON CONG. OPERATIONS, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 402(a)(2) OF THE
LEGISLATIVE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1970 IDENTIFYING COURT PROCEEDINGS AND
ACTIONS OF VITAL INTEREST TO THE CONGRESS 50-57 (1976).
122 Demands for testimony before a judge, at a deposition, or via interrogatories should also be included in the clause's protection.
123 See text accompanying note 110 supra.
124 The inhibition of the legislative duty resulting from the threat of criminal
proceedings and damage suits is plain, but other forms of harassment can similarly
jeopardize freedom of speech and debate. See United States v. Brewster, 408
U.S. 501, 555-56 (1972) (White, J., dissenting). The executive can cause members of Congress to explain their legislative activities to grand juries ostensibly or
actually concerned with the crimes of nonlegislators. Cf. Gravel v. United States,
408 U.S. 606 (1972) (senatorial aide called before grand jury to testify about
Senator's activities). Private parties seeking explanations of why certain legisla-
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In short, Gravel highlights what has been termed the "evidentiary aspect"1 25 of the speech or debate privilege. Not only does
the clause mean that the content of a legislator's speech or debate
12 6
may not be made the basis of either civil or criminal liability,
it has also been construed to mean that legislators may not be required to answer questions about their legislative activities. 2 7
tion was passed or the scope of its coverage can demand that legislators testify as
to their votes or intent. Cf. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S.
491, 516 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("freedom from vexatious and distracting litigation").
It should be noted, however, that the broad description of the purpose of
the speech or debate clause and the corresponding extension of "questioning" to
encompass subpoenas for testimony is debatable. The specific evil that led to the
clause was the British crown's efforts to impose criminal liability for legislative
speech and debate. See note 106 supra. Thus, the "questioning" denominated in
the speech or debate clause, it might be argued, consists of holding legislators
criminally responsible for speech or debate, or, at most, of imposing criminal or
civil liability for legislative activity. Cf. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 16,
at 1,171-76 (arguing that speech or debate immunity is limited to criminal proceedings). While this construction of the clause would permit the type of
"vexatious and distracting litigation" referred to above, it could be argued that
civil and criminal immunity is ample protection for speech or debate. Moreover,
one can hold this narrow view of "questioning," but maintain that protection
from the more subtle forms of harassment and interference with the legislative
process is more appropriately secured by judicial development of a common law
privilege relating to subpoenas seeking testimony about legislative activities in
cases where the subpoenaed persons are not parties to the litigation. Cf. id. at
1174 (advocating a common law rather than constitutional privilege against civil
liability of legislators).
Although it is not too late to suggest that the assumption that "questioning"
includes being subpoenaed be reconsidered, the analysis in this Article follows
Gravel and therefore does not pursue the federal common law privilege that
might follow if this assumption were relaxed. See notes 205-43 & accompanying
text infra.
125 United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773, 777 (7th Cir.), reheard en banc
and decided on other grounds, 537 F.2d 957 (1976), U.S. appeal pending. Other
constitutional protections have evidentiary dimensions as well. The freedom of
expression clause, it has been suggested, establishes evidentiary as well as substantive protections. See Note, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, 79 YALE L.J.
872, 894-95 (1970).
The evidentiary implications of the fourth, fifth and sixth
amendments are well recognized, but, of late, are conceived as increasingly dispensable remedies fashioned to enforce substantive protections. See, e.g., United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971).
126 United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773 (7th Cir.), reheard en banc, 537
F.2d 957 (1976), U.S. appeal pending.
127 Id.; McSurely v. McClellan, 521 F.2d 1024, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
aff'd en banc by an equally divided vote, 45 U.S.L.W. 2311 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21,
1976) (interrogatories, depositions and civil trial); Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 387
F. Supp. 1332 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (dictum) (deposition); United States v. Ehrlichman, Crim. No. 74-116 (D.D.C. July 3, 1974) (Order & Memorandum of July 3,
1974), aff'd in part on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d
76 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Cf. Common Cause v. Bailar, Civ. No. 1887-73 (D.D.C.,
filed Oct. 5, 1973) (Memoranda & Orders of July 30, 1975 and Mar. 1, 1976)
(documentary evidence), reprinted in part in JOINT COMM. ON CONG. OPERATIONS,
supra note 121, at 50-57.
Except for Gravel, however, the Supreme Court cases apparently establishing
evidentiary protections for speech or debate do so in the context of actions
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Finally, in terms of the clause's wording and policy, there is
no reason to distinguish between a subpoena for a personal testimony and one for documentary evidence. Both forms of
discovery may threaten freedom of speech or debate in demanding out-of-chambers explanations of purely legislative activities. Consequently, subpoenas duces tecum, like subpoenas ad
testificandum, have been held to constitute "questioning" within
the meaning of the speech or debate clause.128
2.

What Constitutes Speech or Debate?
Of course, not all "questioning" is prohibited by the speech
or debate clause. Only that "for . . . Speech or Debate" is proagainst legislators. For example, the prohibition on using a congressman's vote
as evidence of a bribe, e.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 525 (1972),
can be understood as resting on the fear that were such evidence admissible, the
congressman might be convicted for the way he voted rather than for the bribe.
Even Gravel can be fit into this interpretation of the evidentiary protections as
being necessary only to prevent the punishment of a legislator for the content of
his speech or debate. Since the grand jury could conceivably have indicted
Gravel (given the Court's application of its definition of speech or debate) for
his role in the acquisition and dissemination to the general public of classified
information, questioning as to what transpired at the subcommittee meeting was
forbidden merely to preclude an indictment resting even in part on the grand
jurors' disapproval of the senator's convening and conducting the unusual meeting.
But see id. at 615 (accepting as "incontrovertible" Gravel's claim that the
clause "protects him from criminal or civil liability and from questioning") (emphasis added). If the "evidentiary" speech or debate clause cases are limited in
this way, testimony about speech or debate could be compelled as long as there
is no possibility of civil liability and all legislators colorably involved in the
conduct under investigation are granted use immunity by the prosecutor. But see
note 128 & accompanying text infra.
128 This is the conclusion that the district court, relying on language from
Gravel, seems to have reached in connection with the Liddy subpoena for congressional testimony, see text accompanying notes 22-27 supra, in United States v.
Ehrlichman, Crim. No. 74-116 (D.D.C. July 3, 1974), aff'd in part on other
grounds sub nom. United States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Immediately after invoking but not analyzing the publication clause, see note 26
supra, Judge Gesell devoted more careful attention to the speech or debate clause,
reasoning:
Moreover, since the requested transcript would reveal "the deliberative
and communicative processes by which Members [of Congress] participate in committee and House proceedings ..
", judicial efforts to
compel production of that document would, under the present circumstances, also violate the Speech and Debate Clause. . . . That provision
clearly prohibits the Court from forcing the Chairman of the Subcommittee or the Speaker to answer questions concerning the testimony at
issue . . . and it would appear to follow that they cannot be required
to produce at trial the official record of that testimony or to put the
issue to a vote of the full House.
Memorandum and Order, supra note 26, at 3-4 (citations omitted; emphasis
added).
The significance of the limiting words "under the present circumstances" is
unclear. While they could relate to the defendant's failure to make a proper
showing of need, see note 27 supra, it seems more likely that they are merely
intended to indicate that Congress' investigation into the conduct of the intelligence community was within Congress' investigatory power and therefore within
the definition of speech or debate.

552

UCLA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24: 523

scribed, and conduct outside this sphere may become the subject
of inquiry or liability without offending the speech or debate
clause. In determining what activities undertaken by members
of the legislature constitute speech or debate, the Supreme Court
has generated various formulae 129 but has provided little in the
way of explicit criteria for applying these formulae. Although
not a case concerning a subpoena for congressional papers, 3
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund,"' the Court's most
recent encounter with the speech or debate clause, provides
perhaps the most comprehensive discussion of the definition of
speech or debate. Senator Eastland, as chairman of the Senate
Subcommittee on Internal Security, had issued a subpoena ordering a bank to produce "any and all records" involving the account
of the United States Servicemen's Fund, an organization suspected
of subversive activities. Arguing that the subpoena infringed its
first amendment rights and those of its members, the Fund sought
declaratory and injunctive relief against the subpoena's enforcement. ' 2 The district court denied the relief, and the court of
appeals reversed, holding that subcommittee members could be
restrained from invading the constitutional rights of the organization that might result from enforcing the subpoena.13 3 Over the
lonely dissent of Justice Douglas, the Supreme Court in turn reversed the court of appeals and held that under the speech or
debate clause, the senators were immune from civil suit for acts
committed in the performance of their legislative duties.13 4 The
Court stated what has become the general rule for ascertaining
whether an activity constitutes speech or debate:
129

See, e.g., Note, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REv. 55

(1973), where the Court's various descriptions of speech or debate have been
compiled:

(a) anything "generally done in a session of the House by one of its
members in relation to the business before it," . . . ; (b) conduct within
the "sphere of legitimate legislative activity," . . . ; and (c) actions

which are "integral part[s] of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to . . . matters which the Constitution places within

the jurisdiction of either House."
Id. at 226-27 n.35 (citations omitted).
130 The plaintiff in Eastland had attempted to take the deposition of a
Senate employee and to require him to produce Senate documents.

sional Papers, supra note 1, at 73.

See Congres-

The district court denied plaintiff's motion to

compel discovery, stating that the information sought by the plaintiff had "been

received by [the employee] pursuant to his official duties as a staff employee of
the Senate" and that "[as] such, the information is within the privilege of the
Senate." 421 U.S. at 499 n.13. The court of appeals and the Supreme Court
permitted this statement to stand without discussion. Id.

11 421 U.S. 4-91 (1975).
132 Id. at 496.
'33 Id. at 496-500.
134 The chief counsel to the subcommittee shared the senators' immunity.
Id. at 507.
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The question to be resolved is whether the actions of the
[senators] fall within the "sphere of legitimate legislative
activity." . . . In determining whether particular activities

other than literal speech or debate fall within the "legitimate
legislative sphere," we look to see whether the activities took
place "in a session of the House by one of its members in
relation to the business before it." . . . More specifically,

we must determine whether the activities are "an integral
part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which
Members participate in committee and House proceedings
with respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of
proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which
the Constitution
places within the jurisdiction of either
13 5
House."
Finding the subcommittee investigation to be within Congress'
power to gather information in aid of possible legislation, and the
issuance of compulsory process to be an essential part of this investigatory power, the Court in Eastland readily classified the
subcommittee's subpoena to the bank as speech or debate.' 6
Once this classification was made, it followed that the legislative
act of issuing a subpoena could not be "questioned" by a civil
7

suit.

13

Although the Eastland case involved questioning in the form
of a civil suit rather than a subpoena for documents, 138 a subpoena
for documents may also constitute forbidden questioning under
the speech or debate clause if the documents evidence conduct
which is part of legislative speech or debate. The Eastland definition of which activities are within the sphere of speech or
debate is therefore useful in determining whether a particular
document is protected from discovery by the clause. As an
example of the application of the Eastland definition to congressional papers, it may be instructive to analyze the protection
given papers generated by congressional investigations, for many
subpoenas of legislative papers are directed towards the discovery
of what congressional investigators have learned or how they have
acquired their information.' 39
135
136

Id. at 501-04 (citations and footnotes omitted).

Id. at 504-07.

In reality, this conclusion is less obvious than the Court's opinion suggests. Prior Supreme Court cases had established only that the freedom of
speech or debate includes an immunity from liability for damages caused by
legislative conduct. See text accompanying note 111 supra. Eastland extends the
137

immunity in civil cases to declaratory and injunctive relief as well. Whether so
broad a construction of "questioning" is appropriate is debatable, since the
specificity of these remedies makes them less an inhibition to vigorous legisla-

tion than the threat of damage judgments considered in the earlier cases.

See

note 111 supra; 55 NEB. L. REv. 299, 312 (1976).
138 See text accompanying note 128 supra.
139 See, e.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 42-1 U.S. 491,
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Congressional investigations which produce papers later subpoenaed tend to fall within the "sphere of legitimate legislative
activity" demarcated in Eastland. Congress' power to investigate
is penetrating and far-reaching, 140 and the Court has yet to find
a duly authorized 4 ' investigation to be in excess of legislative
power. 1 42 Even the fact that the investigation may infringe the
constitutional rights of those under investigation does not affect
the determination that it constitutes "legitimate legislative activity''143 in the context of the speech or debate clause. Eastland
499 n.13 (1975); United States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Calley
v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976);
Christoffel v. United States, 200 F.2d 734 (D.C. Cir. 1952), vacated and remanded, 345 U.S. 947 (1953); United States v. Hoffa, 205 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.
Fla.), cert. denied sub nom. Hoffa v. Lieb, 371 U.S. 892 (1962); Congressional
Papers, supra note 1, at 66-75.
140 On the history and scope of the congressional power to investigate, see,
e.g., R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 15-48 (1974);
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 271-74 (1970); 1 T.
EMERSON, D.

HABER & N.

DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED

STATES 351-54 (3d ed. 1967); J. HAMILTON, THE POWER TO PROBE: A STUDY
OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS (1976).
141 The Court may limit the scope of a committee's investigatory authority
to something narrower than a commission to explore all questions with which
Congress is competent to deal-as by holding that the committee is bound by the
parent body's authorizing resolution, see, e.g., Sacher v. United States, 356 U.S.
576 (1958); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953), or by the chairman's
statement of the scope of inquiry, see, e.g., Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S.
Thus, in Eastland,
702 (1966); Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961).
the Court noted that the subcommittee "was acting under an unambiguous resolution from the Senate authorizing it to make a complete study of the 'administration, operation, and enforcement of the Internal Security Act of 1950 [50
U.S.C. §§ 781 et seq.].'" 421 U.S. at 506.
However, when the Court has read committee authorizations narrowly, it
has usually done so in the context of allowing a defense to witnesses charged
with contempt of Congress. See, e.g., Scull v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 344, 349
(1959). The limitations on Congress' power to hold in contempt a person hailed
before a committee may be more stringent than the constraints upon the comThus, although a committee might not have a
mittee's power to investigate.
sufficiently clear mandate to warrant citing a witness for contempt, it may still
be engaging in "speech or debate" in examining the witness. See generally Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 16, at 1165-68; see also note 143 inra.
142 But cf. DeGregory v. New Hampshire Att'y Gen., 383 U.S. 825 (1966)
(treating investigation of state legislative committee as exceeding legislative
power); Goldman v. Olson, 286 F. Supp. 35 (W.D. Wis. 1968) (same); Liveright
v. Joint Comm., 279 F. Supp. 205 (M.D. Tenn. 1968) (same).
143 421 U.S. at 509-10.
As a consequence, the investigation may not be
enjoined and, presumably, it may not give rise to liability for damages on the
part of the participating legislators. See id. But affected individuals may raise
the unconstitutionality of the investigation as a basis for declining to cooperate
with the investigators. In evaluating constitutionality for this purpose, the Court
may consider the motivation for the investigation and demand a compelling state
interest to justify a significant impact on constitutional rights. See id. at 509
n.16; id. at 515-16 (concurring opinion); Ely, Legislative and Administrative
But see
Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1310-12 (1970).
T. EMERSON, supra note 140, at 274-79.
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confirms that it is enough that the subject of the inquiry is one
144

"on which legislation could be had." ' Therefore, papers generated by a duly authorized investigation cannot be excluded from
the protection of the speech or debate clause on the ground that
the investigation generally exceeds legislative limits and is not
part of "speech or debate."

The inquiry is not over at this point, however.

The mere

fact that a document is in some sense related to the work of a
congressional investigating committee does not ensure that the
document is privileged under the speech or debate clause. Whether
congressional papers are privileged depends on whether the specific
conduct giving rise to the papers is within the sphere of legitimate
legislative activity. Despite the broad scope of Congress' power to
gather information to aid potential legislation, not all conduct
relating to investigations or legislation constitutes speech or
debate. The test is a formal one: Where the conduct in

question takes the form of an official act within the legislative

domain, that conduct is conclusively established as speech or
debate.1 45 For instance, Gravel reveals that when a committee
chairman convenes a committee meeting and addresses the com-

mittee, his conduct is speech or debate irrespective of his reasons
144 421 U.S. at 506. Since federal legislation, in the form of a proposed
constitutional amendment if nothing else, "could be had" on almost any subject,
this limitation on congressional investigations is more illusory than real.
The Supreme Court's observations that Congress does not have "'general'
power to inquire into private affairs," McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 173
(1927), nor "the power to expose for the sake of exposure," Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957) (dictum), could be interpreted to mean that an
improperly motivated investigation exceeds legislative power. See T. EMERSON,
supra note 140, at 273 (describing rather than endorsing this approach); A.
BICKEL, supra note 53, at 208 (same).
However, as a practical matter, this purported limitation on the investigative power has not proved significant, see T.
EMERSON, supra note 140, at 273-74, and, as a formal matter, the Court has
abandoned it. Eastland indicates that any investigation that bears on potential
legislation is not bent on "exposure for exposure's sake." 421 U.S. at 506.
In Eastland, plaintiff alleged that the "sole purpose" of the investigation was to
force "public disclosure of beliefs, opinions, expressions and associations of
private citizens which may be unorthodox or unpopular."
Id. at 508.
In
response, the Court insisted that "[tihe claim of an unworthy purpose does not
destroy the privilege." Id., quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377
(1951). See also Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957) ("motives
alone would not vitiate an investigation which had been instituted by a House
of Congress if that assembly's legislative purpose is being served," id.). But see
Ely, supra note 143, at 1308-13; Shapiro, Judicial Review: Political Reality and
Legislative Purpose: The Supreme Court's Supervision of Congressional Investigations, 15 VAND. L. REV.535 (1962).
145 The courts will not probe further to decide whether the trappings of
speech or debate are being adopted to advance some ulterior, nonlegislative
purpose. See, e.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491
(1975); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
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for calling the meeting and regardless of the connection between
his remarks and the committee's work.1 46 Speaking before an
officially convened group of legislators is, on its face, an activity
constituting speech or debate, and documentation of this conduct
should be privileged from discovery.
The opposite result is reached where conduct is, on its
face, personal or political-even though legislators or legis47

lative employees may participate in it.

False imprisonment,

unreasonable search and seizure,14 wrongful exclusion of a
representative-elect,' 4 9 receipt of a bribe,' 5" arranging for com-

mercial publication of classified information presented to a con146 Surely it would not have been implausible to suggest that Senator
Gravel's presentation of the Pentagon Papers to a hastily convened nighttime
meeting of the Subcommittee on Buildings and Grounds was a none too subtle
attempt to cloak the dissemination of classified information in the garb of
speech or debate. Yet, the Court insisted that the senator's contention that the
unusual meeting was speech or debate was "incontrovertible." 408 U.S. at 615.
Cf. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 526 (1972) (by implication forbidding
the prosecution in a bribery case to "inquire into how [the Senator] spoke, how
he debated, how he voted, or anything he did in the chamber or in committee,"
id.).
Kilbourn was an action
147 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
to recover damages for false imprisonment. The Court held that the speech or
debate clause afforded the defendant members of Congress a good defense since
they had taken no part in Kilbourn's arrest other than to vote that the sergeant
at arms accomplish it. The sergeant at arms, however, was held to answer for
carrying out their unconstitutional directive, and Kilbourn later recovered $20,000
from him. See Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. at 517
(Marshall, J., concurring).
148 Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967).
In Dombrowski, a complaint against Senator Eastland for allegedly subpoenaing documents in violation
of the fourth amendment was dismissed on the basis of his speech or debate
privilege, because voting and signing a subpoena was a legislative act. However,
the Court held that the privilege did not protect the committee counsel who
was charged with conspiring with state officials to carry out an illegal seizure of
records that the subcommittee sought for its own proceedings. See also Eastland
v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. at 514 n.1 (Marshall, J., concurring).
149 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
Powell resulted from a
House resolution excluding representative-elect Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., from
the House and declaring his seat vacant as a result of Powell's alleged misuse of
House funds and unwarranted assertions of immunity from process in New York
courts. Powell (and 13 voters in his district) sought declaratory and injunctive
relief against the majority speaker, the clerk, the sergeant at arms and the
doorkeeper of the House. The Court held that the exclusion was inconsistent
with the constitutional provisions stating the qualifications for membership in
the House. It found that the speech or debate clause justified a dismissal of the
action against members of Congress but did not bar proceedings against the
congressional employees. Although the employees were "acting pursuant to,
express orders of the House," that did not "bar judicial review of the constitutionality of the underlying legislative decision." Id. at 504.
150 United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966). Acceptance of the bribe is not speech or debate, but
voting in accordance with the bribe is. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. at
527.
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gressional subcommittee,' and public printing of a subcommittee
report which invades privacy 5 2 have all been held to comprise
personal or political, as opposed to legislative, conduct; documentation of such conduct is -therefore not privileged from discovery.
These holdings do not undermine the principle that speaking
or debating' 5 ' in favor of, or voting to authorize, tortious, unconstitutional conduct is protected under the speech or debate
clause. Rather, the holdings reveal that legislators are stepping
outside the realm of speech or debate when they engage in such
conduct before the debating and voting are underway, or when,
after the speakiig or debating is concluded, they participate in the
As a result, papers revealexecution of the actionable conduct.'
ing nothing more than the participation of congressmen, congressional employees, or anyone else in such nonlegislative undertakings
cannot claim the protection of the speech or debate clause. For
151 Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972). Scholarly commentary
has tended to be highly critical of this aspect of the Gravel opinion. Reinstein &
Silverglate, note 16 supra; Celia, note 101 supra; Legislative Immunity, supra note
93, at 148-49.
152 Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973). Doe arose out of a House committee report on the District of Columbia schools which, "to 'give a realistic view,'"
id. at 308, included derogatory information about the performance and disciplinary
problems of certain students. On behalf of the students mentioned by name in the
report, petitioners brought an action against the committee members and staff, the
public printer and the superintendent of documents, seeking damages for invasion
of privacy and an injunction against further dissemination of the report. The court
of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint on the ground
that committee members and staff were protected by the speech or debate clause
and the others by general principles of governmental immunity. Justice White
wrote for the Court, affirming the dismissal with respect to the committee members and staff: The complaint failed to allege that they did anything more than
compile the report, refer it to the House, and vote for its publication-all official
legislative acts protected by the clause. But, though the Court conceded the
"importance of informing the public about the business of Congress," id. at 314,
it held that public distribution of the report was not necessarily "an essential
part of the legislative process," id. at 314-15, and that neither the speech or debate
clause nor other principles "immunize those who publish and distribute [as distinguished from voting to publish and distribute] otherwise actionable materials
beyond the reasonable requirements of the legislative function." Id. at 315-16.
Thus, the Court reversed the dismissal as to the public printer and superintendent
of documents to allow the lower courts to determine "whether the legitimate
legislative needs of Congress, and hence the limits of immunity, have been exceeded." Id. at 324-25. See P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTrTUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 380-81 (197.5).

153 For additional examples of acts found to be "clearly" legislative, see
United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 516 n.10 (1972). For other examples of
"political" rather than "legislative" acts, see id. at 512 (preparing speeches for
delivery outside the legislature, making inquiries for constituents, and the like);
Schiaffo v. Helstoski, 492 F.2d 413 (3d Cir. 1974) (abuse of franking privilege);
Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1332 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (televised speech outside
of Congress).
154 See notes 147-52 supra; see also Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 315
(1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 618-22 (1972).
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example, an extant and unshredded memorandum from a congressional investigator to a committee chairman, describing (unlikely as this may be) the installation of a bugging device, the
breaking and entering of a home or office, the warrantless seizure

of personal possessions, or the detention and grilling of a citizen

should not be treated as speech or debate. 5 5 Such materials
stand in sharp contrast to records of votes, transcripts of committee hearings, drafts of speeches intended for delivery to the
full House, papers acquired by Congress through the issuance of

a legislative subpoena, 5 " and
other documentary evidence of what
15 7
is clearly speech or debate.
Although the dichotomy between legislative and nonlegislative activities outlined in Eastland is easy to state in the abstract,
there may well be instances in which the differentiation of speech
or debate from mere political or personal conduct will be
exceedingly difficult to perform. 15 8 But the boundary between

155 Cf. McSurely v. McClellan, 521 F.2d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff'd
en banc by an equally divided vote, 45 U.S.L.W. 2311 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21, 1976)
(congressional perusal of items illegally obtained by state officials).
156 The fact that the committee's decision to subpoena a specific witness
or particular document may have been intended to, or might have the effect
of, stifling freedom of expression or another constitutional right would not make
the acquisition of the document or the transcript of the witness' testimony any the
less speech or debate. See Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421
U.S. 491, 506 (1975) ("Ithe propriety of making USSF a subject of the investigation and subpoena is a subject on which the scope of our inquiry is narrow,"
id.). At most, it would provide a defense for a witness who refused to appear or
to produce the document for the committee. See note 143 supra; Ely, supra note
143, at 1309-10.
On the other hand, the committee's seizure, inspection, or dissemination of
materials known to be "plainly and unmistakably unrelated to the congressional
inquiry" should not, under the reasoning in Eastland and its predecessors, be
treated as legitimate legislative activity within the "finite limits" of the speech or
debate clause. McSurely v. McClellan, 521 F.2d 1024, 1051-52 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(Leventhal, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original), aff'd en banc by an equally
divided vote, 45 U.S.L.W. 2311 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21, 1976) (Leventhal, J., for the
majority).
157 The apparent simplicity of this statement disguises the confusion sometimes engendered by the relation between the subpoenaed congressional materials
and the underlying conduct. For instance, the written report of an unreasonable
search and seizure prepared by a committee investigator and sitting in the files
of the committee is not privileged, since its production would not cause a questioning of speech or debate-an unreasonable search not being a part of speech
or debate. See note 148 & accompanying text supra. But if the report is placed
in the record of an official session of the committee, it becomes documentary
evidence of the committee proceedings-proceedings that do constitute speech
or debate. See note 146 supra. In these circumstances, the report partakes of
the speech or debate privilege. Id.
158 In some respects, Common Cause v. Bailar, Civ. No. 1887-73 (D.D.C.,
filed Oct. 5, 1973), is a case arising out of this twilight zone. Originally filed on
October 5, 1973, this action seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against Postmaster General B. F. Bailar, and Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon. The
complaint alleges that certain uses of the franking privilege, by which members of
Congress may send materials through the mails free of charge, see Franking

1977]

CONGRESSIONAL PAPERS

559

legislative and nonlegislative conduct must be drawn; once
Act of 1973, 39 U.S.C. § 3210 (Supp. V 1975), abridge first and fifth amendment rights, violate statutory duties of the Postmaster General and of the
Secretary of the Treasury, and constitute an unlawful appropriation of public
funds for nonpublic purposes.
In an effort to establish that the franking statute unconstitutionally disadvantages candidates challenging incumbent congressmen, Common Cause subpoenaed not only the records showing which senators and representatives used
the franking privilege and to what extent, but also papers relating to complaints

of misuse made to the Senate Select Committee on Standards and Conduct, the

House Committee on Standards, and a House commission established to oversee
the use of the franked mails. The legislative employees on whom the subpoenas
were served objected to production on a variety of grounds. The subpoenaed
House employees contended, inter alia, that the testimony and documents sought
with respect to the activities of the House Committee on Standards and the House
Commission on Congressional Mailing Standards, which is empowered to refer
"serious and willful" violations of the franking statute to the Committee on
Standards, 39 U.S.C. § 3210(a) (Supp. V 1975), were within the scope of
the speech or debate clause, since the activities of these organs of Congress are
in furtherance of Congress' disciplinary powers, see note 16 supra, and intended to
remedy franking abuses. Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to
Compel Discovery and Production of Documents by Five Employees of the House
of Representatives at 24-28, Common Cause v. Bailar, supra. Plaintiff's rejoinder was that this argument, "taken to its logical conclusion, would mean
that Congress could statutorily expand the scope of the Speech or Debate
Clause to cover any activity merely by making that activity subject to congressional discipline and entrusting its oversight to a House Commission." Reply to
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Testimony and
Production of Documents by Five Employees of the House of Representatives
at 18, Common Cause v. Bailar, supra.
The court disposed of the speech or debate clause objection to discovery in
a single, cryptic paragraph:
Likewise, the claims of constitutional immunity are without weight.
The Brewster case and others clearly demonstrate that congressional
immunity is limited to legislative activities and the claimed use of the
franking privilege for political activities is not covered even by a most
expansive definition of the Speech and Debate Clause. That the use of
the franking privilege is not within the language of Article I, Section 5
[the grant of power to each House to govern the behavior of its members], requires no discussion.
Memorandum & Order of July 30, 1975, at 5, Common Cause v. Bailar, supra,
reprinted in JOINT COMM. ON CONG. OPERATIONS, supra note 121, at 52. Although the court proceeded to grant plaintiffs' motion to compel production
of various congressional documents concerning the use and effects of the franking
privilege, it apparently had second thoughts. Some months later, in a turbid
opinion relating to precisely the same type of documents compiled by the Senate
Select Committee on Standards and Conduct, the same court found the Senate's
virtually identical claim of privilege weighty enough to accept, at least provisionally. This time the three-judge court wrote:
We have given careful thought to the contentions [concerning the
speech or debate privilege claimed for the Senate documents]. It is
conceded that the documents themselves are relevant to the issues in
this case. Whether the documents are privileged may be determined
by whether they relate to the business of Senators or the business of
candidates for the Senate. This approaches a capsule description of the
ultimate issue in this case. We can agree that a privilege for Senatorial
documents exists, without deciding that these documents are Senatorial
and therefore privileged.
At this stage in the lawsuit we think it better to act as if the documents were Senatorial and privileged, with the ultimate decision reserved. Inspection by plaintiffs' counsel, even with all safeguards, would
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drawn,"5 9 it is easy enough to conclude that papers pertaining
in some sense defeat the privilege, if in ultimate analysis these documents were found to be properly entitled to protection.
Memorandum & Order, Mar. 1, 1976, at 4-5, Common Cause v. Bailar, supra.
The court then proceeded to order the committee to produce summaries of the
subpoenaed documents, but not the internal memoranda themselves. Id. The

proceedings in Bailar are described in more detail in

JOINT COMM. ON CONG.

supra note 121, at 45-57.
Plainly, the Bailar court's analysis of congressional privilege as it relates to
Common Cause's subpoenas is something less than a model of clarity. With
respect to the subpoenas for papers reflecting the extent and timing of congressional use of the franking privilege, wholesale discovery should have been compelled only if mailed communications from a legislator to persons outside the
Congress can never qualify as speech or debate. In that event, the information
OPERATIONS,

concerning particular mailings would be documentary evidence of purely non-

legislative conduct, and therefore amenable to subpoena.

If, however, some

mailings count as speech or debate, then compelling production of documentary
evidence about these mailings invades speech or debate. Thus, the relevant issue
for speech or debate purposes is the status of mailings, not who pays for
them. The question of financing is important only in connection with the allegations of statutory and constitutional violations. Whether all mailed communications from Congress to the public are outside the sphere of speech or debate is
not entirely free from doubt. For a defense of the "informing function" of
Congress and an argument suggesting that at least some newsletters should be
treated as speech or debate, see, e.g., Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 16, at
1142-44, 1148-53. But see Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973) (public
printing of actionable material); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512
(1972) (dictum declaring that "so-called 'newsletters' to constituents, news releases,
and speeches delivered outside the Congress" are not entitled to speech or debate
protection, id.).
The records concerning complaints to the House Commission and the Senate
and House committees on standards are more clearly related to speech or debate,
and, hence, immune from discovery. These records document official activity
well within the jurisdiction of each house as enumerated in article I, section 5
of the Constitution to prescribe standards for the conduct of its members and to
discipline them. The Bailar court's observation that "the use of the franking privilege is not within the language of Article I, Section 5," Memorandum & Order,
July 30, 1975, reprinted in JOINT COMM. ON CONG. OPERATIONS, supra note 121,
at 52, is no answer to the contention that exposure of the disciplinary process with
respect to violations of the franking statute amounts to a questioning of speech or
debate. The argument that any activity can be brought within Congress' disciplinary power, and therefore within the speech or debate privilege, is overstated. It is
the exercise of the disciplinary power-not the activity subject to discipline-that is
included in the definition of speech or debate. It is true, however, that the copies
of papers evidencing misconduct contained in the files of the disciplinary committees are privileged, since they also amount to documentary evidence of legislative
conduct-gathering information for disciplinary purposes-which meets the formal test for speech or debate. See text accompanying notes 145-46 supra. Consequently, Congress could, at least in theory, withhold certain evidence of wrongdoing by use of the disciplinary process.
159 Because congressional papers, under the analysis presented here, partake
of the speech or debate privilege through the underlying conduct they document,
a proper classification of the actions taken by legislators and legislative personnel
is vital if congressional papers are to be protected adequately by the speech or
debate clause. It should therefore be emphasized that the discussion of Eastland,
Gravel, and other speech or debate clause cases presented in the text has been
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entirely to nonlegislative matters are not immune from discovery
by virtue of the speech or debate clause.

A more difficult question is whether congressional papers
that do reflect speech or debate may nonetheless be amenable
to subpoena in certain circumstances if they also pertain to nonlegislative behavior. The query, stated another way, is whether
the privilege of speech or debate is absolute' 60 as it pertains to
predominantly descriptive. For more critical treatment of the Court's recent
performance in this area, see, e.g., Celia, note 101 supra; Suarez, note 101
supra; Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Gov't Operations, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973); 46 Miss. L.J. 1112 (1975); 41 Mo. L. REV. 108 (1976); 55
NEB. L. REV. 299 (1976).
160 A privilege is not absolute, as the term is used here, if (1) it may be
defeated by a showing of overriding considerations in a particular case, (2) it
is subject to categorical exceptions, or (3) it is conditioned on good motives and
reasonable behavior. A privilege that exhibits the first characteristic may be
called prima facie rather than absolute. See Wasserstrom, The Obligation to
Obey the Law, 110 UCLA L. REV. 780 (1963). It is susceptible to ad hoc balancing. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 34 (1971); Emerson, Toward a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 912 (1963). The
freedom of a landowner to use his property as he wishes exemplifies a prima
facie privilege, for it can be overcome by a determination that the injuries caused
to adjoining property owners outweigh the social utility of the use in question.
See, e.g., Vowinckel v. N. Clark & Sons, 216 Cal. 156, 13 P.2d 733 (1932). A
privilege that possesses the second characteristic is the product of definitional
balancing-although the privilege, on its face, is applicable, exceptions have been
fashioned in order to accommodate competing interests. See Ely, Flag Desecration:
A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment
Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482 (1975); Nimmer, The Right to Speak From
Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to
Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935 (1968). Privileges of this second type may
also be called prima facie, and are exemplified by evidentiary privileges for various

confidential communications which, like the attorney-client privilege, are subject
to certain categorical exceptions. See, e.g., Note, The Future Crime or Tort
Exception to Communications Privileges, 77 HARv. L. REV. 730 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Future Crime or Tort Exception]. Finally, a privilege that has the
thirid characteristic may be called a qualified, conditional or defeasible privilege.
See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 115, at 786 (4th ed. 1971). For example,
the first amendment privilege to libel public officials is qualified, since the privilege
is overcome by a showing of actual malice. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
These categories of prima facie and qualified privileges may overlap, and
some writers may describe prima facie privileges of the second type as "absolute,"
see note 34 supra, while others refer to privileges that are prima facie in the first
sense as "qualified," "defeasible," or "presumptive," see, e.g., Cox, note 2 supra.
What is important is not so much which labels are used (although adoption of a
more uniform terminology would promote a much needed clarity), but the
realization that if a privilege from liability or discovery is absolute in the sense
suggested here, demonstrating that it applies in a given instance establishes once
and for all that the conduct is protected. In particular, if the privilege of speech
or debate is absolute, papers which document conduct that is, on its face, speech
or debate, are immune from discovery no matter how much a litigant may need
the evidence or how heinous the motives are of those engaged in the legislative
activity. Lest it be thought that the law recognizes no privileges that are absolute
in this strong sense, one need only look to the civil immunity of the judiciary.
See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra § 114, at 777.
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congressional papers. If the privilege is absolute, it is not subject
to any categorical exceptions, and it may not be overcome in a
particular case by a balancing of interests.
The possibility that the speech or debate privilege might be
subject to specific exception is suggested in Gravel v. United
States.'
The Court in Gravel, acting sua sponte, 162 outlined a
protective order that would have permitted questioning con-

cerning the source of the copy of the Pentagon Papers placed in

the subcommittee record. 168

Although such questioning would

necessarily pertain to preparations for a legislative act,'

the ma-

jority maintained that to trace the source of the senator's information would not violate the speech or debate clause. 65 As
others have observed, this portion of the Court's opinion is

"not at all clear."' 166

Some have suggested that in permitting this questioning, the
Court was articulating a criminality exception to the immunity provided in the speech or debate clause, under which questioning
concerning legislative activities would be allowed insofar as it is
pertinent to investigating and prosecuting crime.' 67 This is an
161 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
162 See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 16, at 1155 n.216.
168 408 U.S. at 628-29.
164 See text accompanying notes 129-59 supra.
165 The Court in Gravel explained that it could perceive no
constitutional or other privilege that shields [the Senator's aide], any
more than any other witness, from grand jury questions relevant to
tracing the source of obviously highly classified documents that came
into the Senator's possession and are the basic subject matter of inquiry
in this case, as long as no legislative act is implicated by the questions.
408 U.S. at 628 (footnote omitted). While the proviso that no legislative act be
"implicated" may seem consistent with a broad interpretation of the protection
given by the speech or debate clause, the Court in Gravel also stated that a
protective order would
afford ample protection for the [speech or debate] privilege if it forbade
questioning any witness . . . (1) concerning the Senator's conduct, or

the conduct of his aides, at the June 29, 1971, meeting of the subcommittee; (2) concerning the motives and purposes behind the Senator's
conduct, or that of his aides, at that meeting; (3) concerning communications between the Senator and his aides during the term of their employment and related to said meeting or any other legislative act of the
Senator; (4) except as it proves relevant to investigating possible thirdparty crime, concerning any act, in itself not criminal, performed by
the Senator, or by his aides in the course of their employment, in
preparation for the subcommittee hearing.
Id. at 628-29 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). Since the Court was willing
to allow questioning about any act by the Senator or his aides in preparation for
the subcommittee hearing if the act was itself criminal, or if the information
sought was relevant to the investigation of third-party crime, the Court must
have determined that such questioning would not "implicate" any legislative act.
166 Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 16, at 1155.
167 See, e.g., Brief for United States at 93-94 & Reply Brief for United
States at 19, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), reprinted in UNrrED
STATES v. NIXON, supra note 6, at 367-68, 439; Celia, supra note 101, at 1032.
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overly broad interpretation of Gravel. Whatever the treatment
accorded preparations for the subcommittee meeting,' 6 8 the Court
specifically forbade questioning concerning what transpired at the
meeting.""9 The meeting was legislative activity, and it was absolutely shielded from outside inquiry. Thus, Gravel casts no serious doubt on the conclusion that congressional papers that record

legislative actions, such as transcripts of validly held committee
hearings or tallies of votes, are fully protected by the speech or

debate clause. Even though such papers might be vital to proving criminal activity on the part of a senator, his aide, or anyone
else, production cannot be compelled. 170
Gravel could also be interpreted more narrowly as granting
a criminality exception to the speech or debate privilege for
questioning concerning acts done in preparation for legislative

activity.' 7 '

However, this too appears to be an incorrect inter-

pretation.

Instead of creating a criminality exception, Gravel

simply indicates that one aspect of preparation for legislative activity-the physical act of acquiring information informally from a
private source-is not speech or debate and is therefore subject
to questioning.

17

168 See text accompanying notes 171-72 infra.
169 See note 165 supra.
170 Thus, even if a senator's speech and vote in favor of certain legislation
is relevant to an investigation of whether a third party bribed the senator to
influence him to support the legislation, Gravel does not disturb the clear implication of United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972), decided the same day,
that the prosecution may not "inquire into how [the senator] spoke, how he
debated, how he voted, or anything he did in the chamber or in committee ... "
Id. at 526.
171 In United States v. Dowdy, 479 F.2d 213 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 823, 866, rehearing denied, 414 U.S. 1117 (1973), the circuit court read
the language of the Gravel Court's suggested protective order as allowing inquiry
into speech or debate (1) "'[if] it proves relevant to investigating possible third
party crime,' " or (2) "if the Congressman's act is itself criminal." Id. at 224-25
n.20. Recognizing the possibility that "these exceptions [to the speech or debate
privilege] would engulf the rule," Dowdy limited their application "to cases
where the inquiry focuses on the manner and methods of obtaining certain information." Id. (emphasis added).
It is true that the requirement that the grand jury be investigating thirdparty crime is not a significant limitation. The independence of the legislative
branch is seriously jeopardized by allowing questioning of congressmen about
their speech or debate regardless of the immediate purpose and motives of .the
grand jurors. It is usually not overly difficult to characterize an investigation
as involving third-party crime, and even an investigation initially focused entirely
on third parties can easily evolve into a probe of the legislator's speech or
debate with an eye toward the latter's prosecution and conviction. The other
exception allowing inquiry into a congressman's act "in itself criminal" is also
broad enough to swallow the privilege if an act in furtherance of a conspiracy
is "initself criminal." See also Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 16, at 1155
n.218.
172 Gravel need not be read to sanction questioning about the purportedly
nonlegislative preparatory act of unofficially acquiring information from a private
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Even if no well defined categorical exceptions can be carved
out of the speech or debate privilege, it might still be argued that
the privilege should yield to a strong showing of need in a particular case. At least one Supreme Court Justice has advocated such
an ad hoc balancing test for the speech or debate clause,' 73 and
a few lower courts have thought that United States v. Nixon,'7 4
the Watergate Tapes case, compels such a result.' 75 However,
source when to do so would also entail questioning about an activity the Court
would be willing to call speech or debate. Although the protective order envisioned by the Gravel Court arguably would have permitted such questioning of
preparatory acts, the Court was not actually confronted with a subpoena for a
draft of a speech or a memorandum discussing how a senator might persuade
fellow committee members to vote a certain way. The Court would not have
found it so easy to maintain that the drafting of speeches, communications about
vote-getting strategy, or other such preparatory parts of the legislative process
are outside "the deliberative and communicative processes" of legislation or that
forcing congressmen to explain or defend these activities would not produce an
"indirect impairment" of "pure" speech or debate. 408 U.S. at 625. Indeed,
when the Court in Gravel did focus its attention on an activity it considered to
be speech or debate, it forbade questioning of any kind. See text accompanying
note 146 supra. More recently, in Eastland, when faced with a preparatory step
that was intimately related to literal speech or debate-acquiring information for
the subcommittee by compulsory process rather than through private channelsthe Court found Gravel no obstacle to classifying this activity as speech or debate
and according it "absolute" protection. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's
Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
In short, the protective order outlined by the Court on its own initiative in
Gravel is best seen as an inartful effort to separate questioning implicating
nonlegislative activity from that bearing on speech or debate. That the Court's
phraseology was not up to this task in this unsolicited sketch of an order
limiting future grand jury examination of a witness is not too surprising, since
it is difficult to envision in advance the ways in which various lines of questioning
about a nonlegislative matter could impinge on bona fide legislative activity.
173 In a partially dissenting opinion in Gravel, Justice Stewart complained
that "it is by no means clear to me that the Executive's interest in the administration of justice must always override the public interest in having an informed
Congress." 408 U.S. at 632 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the Justice
asked, "[Wihy should we not, given the tension between the two competing
interests, each of constitutional dimensions, balance the claims of the Speech or
Debate Clause against the claims of the grand jury in the particularized contexts
of specific cases?" Id. (emphasis in original). However, Justice Stewart may
not have considered Senator Gravel's acquistition of the Pentagon Papers to have
been speech or debate-his opinion remains ambiguous on this point. If so,
his recommendation of an ad hoc balancing test may be limited to cases in
which no questions are asked about speech or debate, but an incidental impact
on speech or debate is present.
174 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
175 The three-judge court in Common Cause v. Bailar, Civ. No. 1887-73
(D.D.C., filed Oct. 5, 1973), in passing on the Senate's claim of speech or debate
privilege for subpoenaed committee documents, offered the following obiter
dictum:
[T]here is no doubt that the privilege claimed . . . is not absolute
but is defeasible upon a showing of proper need. As the recent
Watergate experience has taught us, a President's claim of absolute
privilege on the grounds of confidentiality must yield when a proper
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neither principle nor precedent dictates diluting the freedom of
speech or debate in this fashion. The information sought from
Congress may be relevant-even decisive-to the outcome of a
particular case. Furthermore, the information may not be available through any other channels, and the case may involve the
vindication of fundamental human rights or interests of constitutional magnitude. But to say that in such circumstances the privilege must always yield, or must yield at least in those cases where
the speech or debate is not very important in comparison to the
interests asserted by the litigant seeking the information, is hardly
consistent with the speech or debate clause's proscription of questioning for any speech or debate. Such an approach is inherently
fraught with ambiguity and uncertainty in application, 7 " and is
quite at odds with the typical speech or debate clause cases concerned with alleged congressional misconduct. 177 In these cases, the
same clashing of interests and values can be seen yet the privilege
has not yielded. For instance, the lower courts in Eastland v.
United States Servicemen's Fund'l 8 "balanced" the legislative interest in the subcommittee investigation against the danger to free
expression and association posed by production of bank records;
but the Supreme Court eschewed all talk of balancing, insisting
instead that the only relevant inquiry for speech or debate clause
purposes is whether the congressional activity is "within the legitimate legislative sphere."' 1 79 Eastland involved questioning in the
form of a civil suit, but unless the clause's directive against "questioning" has no fixed meaning, and instead varies with the form of
the questioning, balancing is equally inappropriate in deciding
whether documentation of legitimate legislative activity is protected from judicial discovery.' 8 °
showing is made that the
interest require disclosure.

overriding considerations

Order of Mar. 1, 1976, at 4-5, reprinted in

of the

public

JOINT COMM. ON CONG. OPERATIONS,

supra note 121, at 54. Cf. note 34 supra (publication clause privilege treated as
prima facie by district court).
176

Cf. T.

EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMEND-

54 (1966) (critique of balancing test in first amendment cases).
177 See, e.g., cases cited in notes 147-51 supra.
178 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
179 Id. at 509 n.16.
The opinion prefaced this remark with the introductory clause "[wihere we are presented with an attempt to interfere with
However, the fact
Id. (emphasis added).
an ongoing activity by Congress."
that the subcommittee investigation in Eastland had not been concluded should
not limit the holding of that case to situations where the activity is "ongoing."
Such a limitation on the absolute nature of the privilege would be difficult to
reconcile with the Court's sweeping language of the sentence following the
quotation in the text: "The speech or debate protection provides an absolute
immunity from judicial interference." Id.
180 Subpoenas for congressional papers may constitute questioning prohibited by the speech or debate clause. See text accompanying notes 105-28
supra.
MENT
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United States v. Nixon"' l is not to the contrary. In seeking

to quash the Watergate Special Prosecutor's trial subpoena for
sixty-four presidential conversations, the President raised a constitutional claim of absolute privilege.' 8 2

The Supreme Court, in

a unanimous opinion, agreed that the conversations were within the scope of a constitutionally grounded executive privilege,
but held that this privilege was prima facie' s rather than absolute.
On the facts before it, the Court concluded that the privilege
"must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a

pending criminal trial."'"" However, the Court's treatment of
executive privilege tells us very little about legislative privilege."8 5
The Court in Nixon inferred the existence of a privilege for presidential communications in the face of textual'86 and histori181 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
182 For an accessible description of the unprecedented event culminating
in the special prosecutor's subpoena, and the other arguments advanced by the
President in United States v. Nixon and related litigation, see WATERGATE REPORT,
note 23 supra.
183 See note 160 supra. In fact, the Court went out of its way in Nixon to
create a constitutional basis for executive privilege. The government urged the
Court to decide the case by holding that the common law privilege of confidentiality for the executive department did not cover the presidential tape recordings
that had been subpoenaed and that no new privilege-constitutional or otherwiseshould be held to encompass the subpoenaed materials. See Brief for Petitioner,
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974),

reprinted in UNITED STATES V.

NIXON, supra note 6, at 171. Inasmuch as the Court accepted these contentions,
there was no need for it to decide that the evidentiary privilege was anything more
than a judicial construct, modifiable by the courts or Congress. See note 231
infra (common law evidentiary basis *of executive privilege). The pointed
and emphatic recognition in the Chief Justice's opinion for the Court of a constitutional basis for some form of executive privilege was apparently a price paid
for a unanimous opinion. Unpublished address by Philip Lacovara, former Counsel to the Watergate Special Prosecutor, Arizona State University, Oct. 11, 1976.
See also Mishkin, Great Cases and Soft Law: A Comment on United States v.
Nixon, 22 UCLA L. REV. 76, 83-89 (1974). The constitutional basis of executive
privilege is considered more fully at note 186 infra.
184 418 U.S. at 713. The sense in which the privilege is prima facie is not
made clear by the opinion. The Court may have been engaging inad hoc balancing, see note 175 supra; cf. Ratner, Executive Privilege, Self-Incrimination, and the
Separation of Powers Illusion, 22 UCLA L. REv. 92, 104 (1974), but the better
reading of the case is that it establishes a categorical exception to the privilege in
all criminal cases in which relevance and admissibility are shown. See Henkin,
supra note 34, at 42; Mishkin, supra note 183, at 84; note 160 supra.
185 Ci. Kurland, supra note 34, at 74 ("there can be little doubt that the
Court's reasoning in this case is good for this case only," id.).
186 Although the Constitution meticulously delineates certain legislative privileges in article I, it makes no mention of any executive privileges in article II.
According to one delegate to the Federal Convention of 1787, this omission was
deliberate:
Let us inquire, why the Constitution should have been so attentive to
each branch of Congress, so jealous of their privileges, and have shewn
so little to the President of the United States in this respect. .

.

. No

privilege of this kind was intended for your Executive, nor any except
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call"7 indications that no such privilege was intended.'8 8 That this
particular implied privilege was said to be somewhat less than
absolute should come as no great surprise. The speech or debate
privilege, in contrast, is explicitly rooted in the Constitution and
has traditionally been perceived as absolute. Thus, in Eastland,
the Court, without so much as a nod to Nixon, announced no less
than five times that the protection the speech or debate clause
affords to legislative activity is "absolute," and held that the
privilege could not be overcome in that case by a showing of bad
1 89
faith or invasion of constitutional rights.
In brief, the rejection of absolute privilege in Nixon is confined to direct presidential communications;'10 the speech or debate privilege has been left intact and absolute. The privilege does
not bend to accommodate competing interests in particular cases,
and, despite Gravel, it is not subject to general, categorical exceptions. Once a legislative document is classified as speech or debate,
191
it is immune from discovery.

10

that which I have mentioned for your Legislature. The Convention
which formed the Constitution well knew that this was an important
point, and no subject had been more abused than privilege.
They
therefore determined to set the example, in merely limiting privilege
to what was necessary, and no more.
ANNALS

OF CONGRESS

72 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1800), reprinted in 3 M.

supra note 43, at 385 (Pinckney). Certainly, the framers were aware
of the problem of executive privilege. During the debate on legislative privilege, James Madison suggested that the convention consider "what privileges
ought to be allowed to the Executive." The convention recessed at that point,
however, and did not return to the topic in its later proceedings. 2 M. FARRAND,
supra note 43, at 503. The Court's manner of filling this textual vacuum in
Nixon has been the target of much criticism. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, A Political
and Constitutional Review of United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L. REv. '116,
118 (1974).
FARRAND,

187

See generally R.

BERGER,

note 140 supra.

188 As Professor Mishkin put it, "the generalized constitutionally-based privilege seems to emerge full blown from the head of the Court." Mishkin, supra
note 183, at 84.
189 421 U.S. at 503, 509, 510 n.16.
190 Unless the opinion is to have the effect of undermining all absolute evidentiary privileges-and it is hard to believe that the Court meant to precipitate
such a revolution in the law of evidence-the opinion must be confined to these
facts. See Kurland, supra note 34, at 73-74. Thus, other executive communications may be covered by stronger or weaker privileges, depending on the
nature of these communications. For example, the Court intimated that communications in the nature of "state secrets," might be absolutely privileged from
discovery.
191 Of course, part of a letter, memorandum, tape recording, or other document in the possession of Congress may constitute speech or debate, and part
may not. For instance, the subpoenaed item may be a memorandum from a
committee investigator describing unsuccessful efforts to subpoena an organization's membership list, and reporting as well on an unofficial nighttime raid on
the organization's headquarters. Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967),
and Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975), indicate
that the first matter is absolutely privileged as speech or debate since subpoenaing
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Subpoenas to Nonlegislators

Thus far, the protection afforded congressional papers by the
speech or debate clause has been considered solely in the context
of subpoenas to legislators. The argument has been that documentation of "legitimate legislative activity" is an aspect of "speech
information is almost always a legitimate legislative act, whereas the second is
not within the investigatory power of Congress and has no pretense to protection.
Therefore, the committee could not be compelled to produce the first portion of
the memorandum even though this evidence might help demonstrate the motive
for the subsequent illegal acquisition of the list sought by the committee. With
this one part deleted, however, the memorandum should be discoverable.
More generally, if Congress claims the speech or debate privilege for the
particular document, the court should receive evidence on the general nature of
the document. If this evidence fails to prove that production of part or all of
the document would result in exposure of speech or debate, the court should
deny the claim of privilege. In doubtful cases,-in camera inspection for the sole
purpose of deciding whether part or all the subpoenaed material constitutes
speech or debate should be permissible.
This level of judicial scrutiny of congressional claims of the speech or debate
privilege for documents is warranted even though in camera inspection, and perhaps even the general description of items that are ultimately found to expose
speech or debate, can be characterized as infringements of the privilege. See
Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 339 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 93 (1973); Westen, Compulsory Process I1, 74 MICH. L. REV. 192, 248 n.198 (1975).
Unless the
entire question whether a particular item is within the speech or debate privilege is to be relegated to Congress, this minimal degree of extra-legislative
questioning is unavoidable. General description of documents and occasional
in camera inspection is essential to effective and meaningful judicial review of
assertions of-privilege, and it seems doubtful that this process would deter legislative zeal or subject legislators to executive or judicial control. Thus, in other
areas where courts have recognized some rather potent privileges, similar inquiries have been held appropriate and necessary to insure that privileges are
properly invoked and applied, at least in cases where an external perspective, in
itself, is not sufficient to verify the claim of privilege. See, e.g., United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714-16 (1974); EPA v. Mink, supra; United States v.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974); UNITED STATES V. NIXON, supra note 6,
at 589-90 (procedures for maintaining confidentiality of military and diplomatic
secrets); State ex rel. DeConcini v. Superior Ct., 20 Ariz. App. 33, 509 P.2d 1070
(1973), noted in 1 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 147 (1974); Westen, supra at 248 n.198. For
a more detailed analysis of the factors which should induce a court to order in
camera inspection, see Note, Discovery of Government Documents and the
Official Information Privilege, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 168-70 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Discovery]; Note, In Camera Inspections Under the Freedom of
Information Act, 41 U. CI. L. REv. 557 (1974) [hereinafter cited as In Camera
Inspections].
In fact, it can be maintained with considerable plausibility that inspection by
the court alone is inadequate to assess claims of privilege in some situations.
See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 182 (1969); Dennis v.
United States, 384 U.S. 855, 874-75 ('1966). Thus, even with Judge Sirica's
undoubtedly sedulous in camera inspection of the presidential tape recordings
subpoenaed in Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973), certain conversations relevant to the grand jury's inquiry initially were not made available to
the grand jury. See B. WOODWARD & C. BERNSTEIN, THE FINAL DAYS 89, 131
(1976). A court conducting an in camera inspection should consider utilizing
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or debate" and that civil and criminal discovery is a form of
"questioning," at least when the subpoena is addressed to a senator
or representative. In the usual case, however, a subpoena for
papers is served on a legislative employee rather than, or as well
as, a congressman.' 9" Since the clause states only that "they"referring to the legislators themselves-"shall not be questioned,"
it is arguable that no speech or debate clause protection is available to shield nonlegislators commanded by subpoena to produce
papers in judicial proceedings. 198 Indeed, the government adAs
vanced just such a position in Gravel v. United States.'
9 5 Gravel arose from a grand jury subpoena
previously discussed,'
calling for the appearance of an aide to Senator Gravel. In defending the subpoena, the government strongly urged the Court to
differentiate between a subpoena to a legislator and one to his aide,
maintaining that the speech or debate clause confers a privilege
only upon "Senators and Representatives."' 96
The Court in Gravel categorically rejected this construction
of the clause on the theory that "it is literally impossible, in view
of the complexities of the modern legislative process, with Congress almost constantly in session and matters of legislative concern constantly proliferating, for Members of Congress to perform
their legislative tasks without the help of aides and assistants . .. ."
Since "the day-to-day work of such aides is so critical to the
Members' performance,"' 9 7 the Court concluded that "they must
be treated as the latter's alter egos."' 9 8
This sort of functional analysis could be extended to protect
documents against subpoenas duces tecum directed at persons
other than legislators or their immediate aides. One could say
that the custodians of such papers, like congressional aides, are
entitled to the rank of "alter ego," or that the congressional
memoranda, reports, transcripts and other papers are themselves
the assistance of counsel for the party seeking disclosure in evaluating the
subpoenaed materials. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715 n.21
(1974). A protective order enjoining counsel to secrecy may be appropriate in
such circumstances. See In Camera Inspections, supra at 559 n.19.
192 See note 104 supra.
193 Under this view, the speech or debate clause parallels the homomorphic
immunity from arrest clause, which protects congressmen but not their agents
from arrest. See note 62 supra. The position is at least consistent with a recognition that, as a procedural matter, the congressman affected may move to
quash such subpoenas. See, e.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund,
421 U.S. 491, 501 n.14 (1975).
194 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
195 See text accompanying notes 112-27, 146, 161-72 supra.
196 408 U.S. at 616.

19'
198

Id.
Id. at 616-17.
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indispensable to intelligent legislation, and hence, deserve protection in their own right.
Yet, this alter ego reasoning, whatever its intrinsic merit,199
is not needed to resolve the issue of subpoenas to nonlegislators.

Searching for alter egos or functional equivalents to the antecedents of the word "they" as used in the speech or debate clause

is a cumbersome method of construing the clause.

A simpler

analysis is one which focuses on the meaning of "questioning."
It may be that only "Senators and Representatives" are privileged,
but one need not drive a legislator to the witness stand in order to
"question" the legislator regarding his or her speech or
debate.
The "central role" of the speech or debate clause is to "prevent
intimidation [of legislators] by the Executive and accountability
before a possibly hostile judiciary. ' 20 0 The legislative branch is
subjected to "questioning" in this sense when aides are compelled
to discuss legislative speech or debate or when file clerks are required to produce documentary evidence of speech or debate. 0 1
Thus, when a subpoena is served on a custodian of congressional
papers, the inquiry should be whether the subpoenaed materials
are of such a nature that their production-by anyone-would
"bring the [legislature's] conduct into question, ' 20 2 not whether the
custodian is an aide or employee who earns his keep or whether
preparing and storing papers is an essential legislative enterprise. 0
199 See note 203 infra.
200 United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181 (1966), quoted in Eastland
v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502 (1975), Doe v. McMillan,
412 U.S. 306, 341 (1973), and Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 617
(1972). See generally notes 106-28 & accompanying text supra.
201 See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 67, § 2193, at 74-75.
202 408 U.S. at 612 n.9. At some point, it might seem that a legislator's
unofficial and indiscreet communications might amount to a waiver of the
speech or debate privilege and that this question of waiver should also be part
of the inquiry. Suppose, for instance, a congressman brings notes of his remarks
and those of his colleagues at a committee meeting to a dinner, reads aloud from
these notes, and leaves them with the host. Grand jury interrogation of those
attending the party about these communications or a subpoena duces tecum to
the host demanding production of the notes would still constitute one form of
"questioning" implicating speech or debate, even though dinner
companions are
not vital to the 20th century legislative process. Should the congressman's
indiscretions be treated, then, as a waiver of the speech or debate privilege?
Since the privilege belongs to the House as a whole and an individual member is
not authorized to act for his House in this area, see, e.g., Congressional Papers,
supra note 1, at 61 n.19, there can be no waiver without the consent of the
House-just as an attorney cannot waive his client's attorney-client privilege
without the client's consent or one spouse cannot waive his or her partner's
marital privilege. See, e.g., 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 67, § 2327, at 635; id.
§ 2340, at 671. But see United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773, 780-81 (7th Cir.),
reheard en banc and decided on other grounds, 537 F.2d 957 (1976).
203 In contrast, the complexity of 20th century life and legislation is undoubtedly important to an analysis of the judicially crafted official immunity
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If legislators, individually and as a group, are not to be "ques.
tioned" for their speech or debate, no explanation-documentary
or verbal--of speech or debate can be compelled outside the
halls of Congress.
doctrine as it applies to damage suits against legislative personnel. This doctrine,
as explained in Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973), "has in large part been
of judicial making," and
confers immunity on Government officials of suitable rank for the
reason that officials of government should be free to exercise their
duties unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits in respect of acts
done in the course of those duties-suits which would consume time and
energies which would otherwise be devoted to governmental service
and the threat of which might appreciably inhibit the fearless, vigorous,
and effective administration of policies of government.
Id. at 318-19 (citations omitted). The scope of this immunity is tied to the
scope of the official's authority. Id. at 320. Some officers are absolutely
protected in the exercise of their discretionary functions, but others have been
given only a qualified privilege-one that yields on a showing of malice. Id.
at 319. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 160, § 132, at 987-92; Jaffe, Suits
Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REv. 209
(1963).
Unfortunately, the Court has usually treated the civil immunity of legislative
employees as an aspect of the speech or debate clause immunity rather than as a
special case of the general immunity doctrine fashioned to protect public officials.
In Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967), for instance, the Court wrote
that for the purpose of imposing civil liability, the counsel to the Senate subcommittee need not be treated as if he were a private citizen, for the speech or
debate clause immunity "is less absolute, although applicable, when applied to
officers or employees of a legislative body, rather than to legislators themselves."
Id. at 85. In Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973), the Court did discuss the
official immunity doctrine in its own right, but only after asking whether the
speech or debate clause immunized a legislator engaging in the alleged tort. In
so doing, the Court was willing to assume that all legislative functionaries partake
equally and fully in the absolute immunity the speech or debate clause gives
congressmen. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1,
189-90 (1971).
It is far from clear that the speech or debate clause should be construed in
this manner. It is one thing to hold that a congressman may with impunity take
official action out of spite and with reckless disregard of constitutional rights,
and quite another to say that the speech or debate clause gives this same immunity
to all legislative functionaries, from the highest to the lowest. Why, after all,
should a subcommittee counsel be permitted to recommend subpoenaing a particular witness when he is motivated solely by racial prejudice, personal pique, or
dislike of the witness' politics or ideas?
The speech or debate clause tells us we
must tolerate such actions on the part of committee members, but why must we
accept them also from every person on the committee's payroll? Because congressmen need assistants? Because the legislative process is more complex than
it was a century ago? Because the enactment of legislation will be hampered if
employees are not given an absolute privilege? Concededly, the speech or debate
clause is concerned with such matters, but neither its wording, its history, nor its
policies dictate an absolute privilege for absolutely everybody connected with
speech or debate. In short, it would be preferable to recognize the problem of
civil liability of legislative employees for official conduct for what it is-a
special case of the general, judicially manufactured, and far more flexible doctrine
of official immunity. Cf. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. at 617 (relying on
Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), the leading official immunity case);
Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 16, at 1171-77.
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Summary

Of the three article I clauses that comprise the explicit privileges of the legislative branch, only one protects against subpoenas for congressional papers. The immunity from arrest
clause privileges the person of a legislator from civil arrest, but
does not absolve a congressman or anyone else from the
obligations of a subpoena. The publication clause enables Congress to withhold military and diplomatic secrets from the public
journal of its proceedings-but not from trial or pretrial discovery.
Only the speech or debate clause privileges Congress from judicial
discovery of those papers that document or describe "legitimate
legislative activity." This speech or debate privilege is absolute
in that it does not give way to a showing of malice, criminality,
or overriding interests. The fact that the privilege is not thus
qualified, however, does not free a court from its obligation to
determine in a proper case and in accord with the usual rules of
evidence whether production of part or all of a paper in Congress'
custody would expose "speech or debate."2 °4
II.

IMPLIED PRIVILEGES

Had no privileges been explicitly given the legislative branch
in the Constitution, some probably would have been invented.
The existence of such privileges, called implied privileges, would
have been inferred from general notions of necessity and separation of powers.2 °5 Indeed, that is precisely what the Supreme
Court did for the executive branch in United States v. Nixon.2 °6
This section considers the relevance of the principles of separation
0
of powers and necessity, and of the Nixon case in particular, T
to Congress' privilege to maintain the confidentiality of its papers
against judicial subpoena.
A.

Separationof Powers

Legislators have on occasion claimed privilege on separation
of powers grounds. Proposing a resolution in response to defense
subpoenas in United States v. Hojfa,2 8 for instance, Senator
See note 191 supra.
See Freund, supra note 16, at 20-21.
206 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
20T The significance of United States v. Nixon for express constitutional
privileges, primarily the speech or debate clause, has already been discussed, and
it has been argued that the case does not mark the coming of the end of absolute
privileges. See notes 34 & 181-91 & accompanying text supra.
208 205 F. Supp. 710 (S.D. Fla.), cert. denied sub nom. Hoffa v. Lieb, 371
Hoffa
See Congressional Papers, supra note 1, at 69-71.
U.S. 892 (1962).
addressed subpoenas to the chairman and various employees of certain Senate
204
205
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McClellan alluded to "certain privileges" which the Senate enjoys
"as a separate and distinct branch of government." 09 Although
210
such declarations often smack of the ignotum per ignotius,

three distinct arguments are implicit in a general reliance on separation of powers. 211 First, reference to separation of powers may
be tantamount to an assertion of legislative immunity from all judicial process or compulsion.2 12 If so, the argument is uncon-

vincing. As the Court held in United States v. Nixon, the separation of powers doctrine does not insulate any one branch of

government or place it beyond the effective reach of the other
two. I Article I specifically immunizes members of Congress
from civil arrest, but leaves them susceptible to service of process

and judicial command. 214 The mere fact of a tripartite system
of government does not supply what seems to have been deliberately omitted from this article of the Constitution.2 15 Thus, the
216
judiciary has repeatedly issued mandatory orders to executive
committees seeking information derived from electronic and mail surveillance of
Hoffa and his associates.
209 108 CONG. REc. 3627 (1962).
210 See R. BERGER, supra note 140, at 45-47.
211 See Gunther, Judicial Hegemony and Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon
Case and the Impeachment Process, 22 UCLA L. REv. 30, 33-34 (1974).
212 Consider the statement of Senator Stennis relied on by Judge Wilkey,
dissenting in Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973):
"We now come face to face and are in direct conflict with the established doctrine of separation of powers. .

.

. I know of no case where

the court has ever made the Senate or the House surrender records from
its files, or where the Executive has made the Legislative Branch surrender records from its files-and I do not think either one of them
could."
Id. at 773, quoting Senator Stennis' statement in SENATE COMMIITEE ON ARMED
SERVICES, MILITARY COLD WAR ESCALATION AND SPEECH REVIEW POLICIES, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 512 (1962) (footnote omitted). See also Calley v. Callaway, 382
F. Supp. 650 (M.D. Ga. 1974), rev'd, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 911 (1976), quoting Subcommittee Chairman Herbert's letter to the
Calley court-martial: "As you know, the Constitution created the Congress as
an independent branch of the government, separate from and equal to the executive and judicial branches. As a separate branch, it is our belief that only the
Congress can direct the disclosure of legislative records." 382 F. Supp. at 702.
213 418 U.S. at 707.
See generally J. PELTASON, CORWIN
SON'S UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION 24 (5th ed. 1970);

AND PELTA-

Frohnmayer,
The Separation of Powers: An Essay on the Vitality of a Constitutional Idea, 52
ORE. L. REV. 211, 217-19 (1973); Ratner, supra note 184, at 92-93; Note, Developments in the Law-National Security, 85 HARv: L. REV. 1130, 1217 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as National Security]; Brief for United States at 51 (footnotes
omitted), United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), reprinted in UNrrED
STATES V. NIXON, supra note 6, at 210.
214 See text accompanying notes 61-98 supra.
215 See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 710-11 (D.C. Cir. 1973); notes 83,
supra & 216 infra.
216 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (affirming an
order compelling the President to produce documentary evidence for use at
trial); United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (affirming
an order requiring the government to make full disclosure of illegally wiretapped
conversations); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
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and legislative 217 officials.
A more modest, but no more tenable, inference from the
separation of powers is that it is for Congress, not the courts,
to decide what documents are shielded from judicial discovery.
The Court unanimously rejected this interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine as applied to the executive branch in
United States v. Nixon. 218 The case for allowing Congress to

be the judge of which of its papers are privileged is no stronger.
The framers chose to have legislative privileges defined "by law"

instead of legislative fiat,"1 9 and the courts have implemented this
(affirming an injunction compelling the Secretary of Commerce to restore steel
mills to private operators); Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12
Pet.) 524 (1838) (issuing mandamus to Postmaster General, commanding him
to comply fully with an act of Congress).
217 See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548-49 (1969); Glidden
Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 568-71 (1962); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196
(1882); Davis v. Ichord, No. 23,426 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 20, 1970); Hentoff v.
Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1970). Thus, in Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S.
306 (1973), the Court did not suggest that the separation of powers doctrine bars
injunctive relief against Congress, notwithstanding Justice Rehnquist's reliance on
this point in his dissent, id. at 343, and previous precedent, Methodist Federation
for Social Action v. Eastland, 141 F. Supp. 729, 731 (D.D.C. 1956), and dictum,
Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 500 (1867), to this effect.
218 The Court, however, may not have recognized this "commitment to another branch" argument as an aspect of the President's invocation of separation of
powers. See 418 U.S. at 693, 703-06. The Court's opinion does not provide the
clearest exposition of the reasons for its holding. See Gunther, note 211 supra.
For a more elaborate and lucid justification of the result in Nixon, see Karst &
Horowitz, note 90 supra. For an impassioned defense of judicial review of
invocations of government secrecy, emphasizing the excesses inherent in allowing
an involved party to make secrecy decisions, see R. BERGER, note 140 supra.
Additional literature on executive privilege includes Berger, Congressional Subpoenas to Executive Officials, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 865 (1975); Berger, Executive
Privilege, Professor Rosenblum, and the Higher Criticism, 1975 DUKE L.J. 921;
Danielson, Presidential Immunity from Criminal Prosecution, 63 GEO. L.J. 1065
(1975); Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 371,
387-91 (1976); authorities cited in CongressionalPapers, supra note 1, at 58 n. 11.
219 From tentative protestations offered as palladiums against the displeasure
of the King in medieval times, parliamentary privilege in England had become,
by the end of the 18th century, an amorphous and expansive set of rights exercised by the legislature. See, e.g., M. CLARKE, supra note 62, at 2; Celia, supra
note 106, at 3-13. As explained in Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178
(1957),
[T]he House of Commons and the House of Lords claimed absolute and
plenary authority over their privileges. This was an independent body
of law, described by Coke as lex parliamenti. Only Parliament could
declare what those privileges were or what new privileges were occasioned, and only Parliament could judge what conduct constituted a
breach of privilege.
Id. at 188 (footnote omitted). The framers did their best to withhold from the
national Congress this power of the British Parliament. When Pinckney moved
"that each House should be the judge of the privilege of its own members," the
delegates favored Madison's advice that "it would be better to make provision
for ascertaining, by law, the privileges of each House, than to allow each House
to decide for itself." 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 43, at 502-03 (emphasis in
original).

19771

CONGRESSIONAL PAPERS

feature of the Constitution. 220

575

When the framers felt that Con-

gress should be the body to decide whether particular activity was
privileged, an explicit commitment was made.2 ' As to a claim
of a general privilege over congressional papers, there is no textually demonstrable commitment of the question to Congress and

no lack of judicially manageable standards for adjudicating claims
of legislative privilege, even as to papers involving diplomacy and
defense. 222 Therefore, the division of government into three
coordinate branches does not, in itself, place within the exclusive
domain of the 3 legislature the power to determine which papers
22
are privileged.

220 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 713-16; Doe v. McMillan,
412 U.S. 306, 3.16 (1973).
Although the pragmatic aphorism that Congress'
privileges are what a majority of Congress says they are recurs from time to
time, see, e.g., H.R. Res. 1306, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REC. 41357
(1970) ("[lt has been settled law in both England and America that a single
house does not have the power to define its own privileges," id.); Reinstein &
Silverglate, supra note 16, at 1178. See generally Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367, 376-77 (1951); L. CUSHING, supra note 66, § 537, at 219; T. TASWELLLANGDMEAD, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 583 (11th ed. 1960).
221 See, e.g., text accompanying note 17 supra.
222 Cf. Karst & Horowitz, supra note 90, at 63-64 (comparable analysis of
executive privilege). The need for secrecy in such areas is considered at text
accompanying notes 224-43 infra. The "committed to another branch of government" test is an aspect of the political question doctrine discussed at notes 53-58
& accompanying text supra. It is an appropriate test here, for the contention
that the separation of powers implies that congressional assertions of documentary
privilege are cognizable in court is, in essence, a claim that the matter is a
"political question" and not subject to judicial resolution.
223 The history of legislative responses to judicial subpoenas does not advance the claim of absolute privilege based on separation of powers. First, early
legislative assertions of privilege were actually far more narrow and defensible.
See Congressional Papers, note 1 supra. In fact, the congressional practice of
deciding whether members or employees should supply evidence to other tribunals
appears to have originated in circumstances where separation of powers arguments were quite inapposite. In 1819, the Senate was asked to grant permission to
two of its members to testify at hearings before a committee of the House, and in
1832, the Senate allowed its doorkeeper to testify in response to a summons from
another House committee. See H.R. JoUR., 15th Cong., 2d Sess. 787, 870-71
(1819); S. JOUR., 22d Cong., 1st Sess. 370 (1832). Second, legislative assertions,
even if they had been more absolute, would not establish an absolute privilege
grounded in the separation of powers. As Professor Cox points out, "[n]either the
House nor the Senate has ever persisted, upon the basis of the separation of
powers, in a refusal of evidence needed in a judicial proceeding." Cox, supra
note 2, at 13-95. Third, the presence of explicit constitutional provisions delineating legislative privileges minimizes the need to resort to generalized separation of powers, arguments and the associated "gloss" of history. See R. BERGER,
supra note 140, at 98. Finally, even if the congressional claims could bear the
characterizations given them by the dissenters in Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700
(D.C. Cir. 1973), their "precedential value would still be quite limited." Powell
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546-47 (1969). See Note, The Power of a House
of Congress to Judge the Qualifications of Its Members, 81 HARv. L. REV. 673,
679 (1968). For a general study of the relationship between historical practices
and constitutional adjudication, see C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
USES OF HISTORY (.1969).
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The third argument implicit in the invocation of separation
of powers is the strongest. Not all powers are shared by all
branches of government. 2 4 If separation of powers means anything, it means that one branch of government may not exercise
a power exclusively committed to another branch. 225 The question is therefore whether judicial subpoenas for congressional
papers constitute a form of judicial usurpation 22 6 of legislative
power. If Congress is unable to exercise its exclusive enumerated
powers wisely and effectively because of judicial subpoenas, arguably such usurpation has taken place. 227 Therefore, the argument
continues, some degree of legislative privilege may be necessary to
assure that Congress can effectively exercise its enumerated powers.
At this point, the separation of powers analysis becomes an argument about the inherent need for confidentiality-a matter con-

sidered in its own right in the next section.228
B.

The Need for Confidentiality

The business of the legislature is to legislate,229 and to legislate wisely and well, Congress must acquire and process information. It must engage in interrnal discussion and deliberation
and seek external feedback. The legislative branch therefore

may assert that efficient operation of legislative business requires
224 The power to pardon, for example, is lodged entirely with the executive
department. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1872).
Deciding cases, on the other hand, is a purely judicial function. Id.
225 Examples of usurpation by one branch of the enumerated powers of
another branch are easily constructed. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128
(1872).
226 Where the executive department demands information from Congress
through the use of grand jury or other judicial subpoenas, the question of executive usurpation of legislative power is also raised.
227 In cases where the issue is the exercise of a power exclusively committed
to one branch, see notes 224-25 supra, recognition that powers are separate is
important. The doctrine of separation of powers is less useful, however, in cases
where the alleged interference by one branch lies only in a general weakening or
diminution in the ability of another branch to conduct its business. See Cox,
supra note 2, at 1387-91.
228 The practical argument can be advanced independently of the notion of
separation of powers, in which case it is cast as a claim of inherent power.
Claims of "inherent power," Professors Karst and Horowitz have observed,
"always come down to arguments based on necessity." Karst & Horowitz, supra
note 90, at 62. Thus, in United States v. Nixon, the Supreme Court perceived
the executive's interest in confidentiality as "common to all governments" with
its "constitutional underpinnings" in "the nature of enumerated powers" rather
than as an aspect of the President's separation of powers arguments. 418 U.S.
at 705-06.
229 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952);
Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A ludicial Brick Without Straw, 53 COLUM. L.
REv. 53 (1953).
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that its papers be protected to assure vigorous investigation,
candid interchange, frank discussion, and confidentiality of mili,tary and diplomatic secrets. These concerns are not unknown to
the courts. The executive branch, in the absence of any explicit

constitutional provision for such protection, has made similar
claims,2"' and the courts have granted 28 ' the executive branch a

series of prima facie or qualified" 2 evidentiary privileges 238 concerning official papers containing advice, 23 4 investigatory files and

litigation materials,235 the identities of confidential informants,23

230 On the history of executive assertions of privilege predicated on these
interests, see, e.g., Berger, note 47 supra; Cox, supra note 2, at 1395-1405; Dorsen
& Shattuck, Executive Privilege, the Congress and the Courts, 35 OHIO ST. L.J.
1, 11-13 (1974); National Security, supra note 213, at 1212-14.
231 On the judicial derivation of evidentiary privileges for executive branch
materials, see, e.g., Veeder, supra note 101, at 144-46; Discovery, supra note 191,
at 156-65.
Some privileges are given the executive by specific statutes, e.g., 13 U.S.C.
§ 9 (1970), generally prohibiting official disclosure of census information, and
others are recognized in the form of exceptions to the disclosure mandated by
the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (Supp. V 1975). See Discovery, supra note 191, at 145-56. As originally approved by the Supreme Court
in 1972, the proposed federal rules of evidence would have codified the judicially
established "state secrets," "official information," and "informer" privileges. See
FED. R. Evm. 509-510. As enacted by Congress, however, the rules make no
attempt to specify the content and types of such privileges, relying instead on
continued common law development. See id. 501 ("the privilege of a witness,
person [or] government . . . shall be governed by the principles of the common
law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience").
232 See note 160 supra.
233 See generally Berger & Krash, Government Immunity from Discovery,
59 YALE L.J. 1451 (1950); Cox, supra note 2, at 1393, 1401, 1407-19. As to the
exceptions or qualifications to these privileges, see, e.g., Discovery, supra note
191, at 160-65; Future Crime or Tort Exception, note 160 supra.
234 See, e.g., Ash Grove Cement Co. v. F.T.C., 519 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Washington Research Project, Inc. v. H.E.W., 504 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1976); Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336 (D.C.
Cir. 1-969); Davis v. Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 363 F.2d 600 (5th Cir.
1966); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 280 F.2d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958);
Chatterton v. Secretary of State for India, [1895] 2 Q.B. 189; Hennessy v.
Wright, [1888] 21 Q.B. 509; M'Elveney v. Connellan, [1864] 17 Ir. R.C.L. 55
(report of Inspector-General of Prisons to Lord Lieutenant of Ireland); C. Mc-

CORMICK,

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §

RULES OF EVIDENCE 508 (1974).
235 See, e.g., Center for Nat'l

107 (2d ed. 1972); UNIFORM

Policy Review on Race & Urban Issues v.
Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Brown v. Thompson, 430 F.2d
1214 (5th Cir. 1970); Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339 (E.D. Pa. 1973);
Pilar v. SS Hess Petrol, 55 F.R.D. 15-9 (D. Md. 1972); Reliable Transfer Co. v.
United States, 53 F.R.D. 24 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation,
Inc., 50 F.R.D. 385 (W.D.N.C. 1969); Dorsen & Shattuck, supra note 230, at
26-29.
236 See, e.g., Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. .53 (1957); Vogel v. Gruaz,
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presidential communications, 5 7 or state secrets.28 8 Although not
all of these categories can be mechanically transferred to the legislative domain, 23 9 a generally comparable framework of government privileges for legislative papers could be claimed by Congress to accommodate its need for confidentiality. 24 ° However,
Congress cannot plausibly claim that an absolute privilege for all
papers is necessary. Congress would undoubtedly be able to
maintain its integrity as an independent and coordinate branch of
government without so extravagant a privilege. Certainly, the executive department has survived and thrived 24 1 without an abso2 42
lute privilege in any of these areas.
110 U.S. 311, 316 (1884); United States v. Day, 384 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1967);
Schultz v. Strauss, 127 Wis. 325 (1906); Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass.
487 (1872); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 234, § 111; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note
67, at § 2374.
287 See text accompanying notes 181-91 supra.
238 See, e.g., EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973); United States v. Reynolds,
345 U.S. 1 (1953); Schaffer v. Kissinger, 505 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1974); 8 J.
WIGMORE,

supra note 67, § 2378, at 794-96; C.

MCCORMICK,

supra note 234, at

§§ 107-08; Zagel, The State Secrets Privilege, 50 MINN. L. REv. 875 (1966).
239 The privilege recognized in United States v. Nixon for direct communications to and from the President, for example, see text accompanying notes 18191 supra, has no simple legislative analog. The informant's privilege also suffers
in the translation. See note 236 & accompanying text supra.
240 Looking to the law of evidence to solve the necessity problem would
not be inconsistent with the constitutional underpinnings of the legislature's privilege. See Freund, supra note 16, at 20-21. But see Mishkin, supra note 183, at
84-85.
In United States v. Nixon, it is true, the Supreme Court took a somewhat different approach to the argument based on necessity. Following the path marked
by the court of appeals in the related case of Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), the Court held that the inherent need for confidentiality of communications between a President and his advisors would be satisfied by a defeasible or
presumptive privilege-one that would yield to other interests of constitutional
magnitude in appropriate cases. 418 U.S. at 715. See generally Cox, note 2
supra. This ad hoc balancing test, if that is what it is, see note 184 supra, has little
to recommend itself for application outside the zone of direct presidential communications. The uncertainty and ambiguity of ad hoc balancing are troublesome
enough, see T. EMERSON, supra note 140, at 253-56, and there is no good reason
to demand as powerful a showing as the Watergate Special Prosecutor was able to
make when disclosure of executive communications not involving presidential
policy discussions is sought.
241

See, e.g., A.

SCHLESINGER,

JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESMENCY

(1973); E.

CoRwIN, note 93 supra. Confrontations between Congress and the executive re-

sulting from congressional demands for information have been resolved by political
accomodation rather than judicial decision. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 2, at
1425-32.

It is conceivable that the growth of executive power might have been

impeded somewhat by judicial enforcement of legislative subpoenas in accordance
with the evidentiary principles developed in the context of litigation with private
parties. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 140, at 342-47.
242 Even with respect to military and diplomatic secrets, the courts will
review a claim of privilege and decide for themselves whether a document contains such secrets, and hence should not be disclosed in open court. See, e.g.,

Committee for Nuclear Resp., Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir.), injunc-
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In sum, inferences predicated on nothing more than general
principles of government structure and necessity hardly dictate an
implied privilege that would make Congress the judge of whether
papers in its possession are exempt from discovery. The a priori
reasoning characteristic of the separation of powers arguments and
the argument from practical necessity point in the direction of
limited evidentiary privileges applicable to legislative papers. Such
limited privileges add little of substance to the more powerful,
explicit privilege encapsulated in the speech or debate clause. 43
CONCLUSION

2' 44
"Papers," one novelist wrote, are "the sinews of litigation.
When papers needed in litigation are held by Congress, and
Congress objects to disclosure, the Constitution entrusts the judiciary with the delicate task of determining whether production of
congressional papers would infringe the freedom of speech or debate.245 No constitutionally based privilege gives congressional
papers more protection than this, but this protection is neither trivial nor negligible. If Congress can establish to judicial satisfaction that "legitimate legislative activity" would be implicated
by compliance with a subpoena,2 4 6 the role of the court is at an
end. Judicial balancing of the legislature's need for confidentiality against the litigants' need for discovery is impermissible.2 4 The balance has already been struck by the Constitution
in favor of speech or debate.
Where speech or debate would be brought into question by
compliance with a subpoena, the Constitution leaves it to Congress
to decide whether secrecy is in the public interest. In making
this determination, however, Congress should be guided by the
tion denied, 404 U.S. 917 (1971); Karst & Horowitz, supra note 90, at 64; National
Security, supra note 213, at 1219-20; note 191 supra. The negative pregnants
concerning national security in United States v. Nixon should not be read to state

a different rule. See Freund, supra note 16, at 33.

The potential for abuse that

inheres in allowing an official, legislative or executive, to block all inquiry into a

matter in which he might be involved on the basis of unexamined assertions of
national security is too great. See, e.g., Berger, The Incarnation of Executive
Privilege, 22 UCLA L. REV. 4, 28 (1974); Ratner, supra note 184, at 103-04;
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 67, § 2379, at 809-10. The tendency to maintain the

secrecy of classified materials long after the need for secricy has vanished is all
too often irresistable. See, e.g., Book Review, 193 Sci. 668 (1976). In fact,
McCormick goes so far as to contend that the judge's duty is "to strike a wise
balance" between private interests and conflicting public policies in each case. C.
McCoRMicK, supra note 234, § 110, at 235.
243 See text accompanying notes 99-204 supra.
244 S.BEDFORD, THE FACES OF JUSTICE 299 (1966).
245 See text accompanying note 204 supra.
246 See text accompanying notes 135-39 supra.
247 See text accompanying notes 160-91 supra.
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same considerations that prompted the founders of the Consti,tution to adopt specific congressional privileges.2 48 These privileges were included in the Constitution to give Congress a shield
against a hostile executive or judiciary. 49 The Constitution does
not require Congress to raise that shield at every available opportunity and Congress has not done so. Where there is no attack, as,
for example, when a defendant seeks pretrial discovery of testimony given by his accusers to a congressional committee, there
need be no defense and the papers should be released.25 It
should not be necessary to belabor the dangers that lurk in
cloaking the business of government-legislative or executivein secrecy. 251 There will be occasions when Congress rightly desires to conduct its official business in private, as when publicity
would cause immediate and irreparable injury,2 52 but these will be
infrequent and unusual. Cloakroom conversations may not be
meant for public broadcast, but, in general, compliance instead
of defiance should be the rule when subpoenas are issued.255
Unless Congress has good reason to think a subpoena is part of
an attack by a hostile executive or judiciary, or that disclosure
would cause immediate and irreparable damage to military or
that "the public
diplomatic affairs,254 it should heed the principle
255
evidence.1
man's
every
to
right
a
.. . has
248

See, e.g., notes 108-11 & accompanying text supra.

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 3 (speech or debate clause), discussed
at notes 99-204 & accompanying text supra.
249

250

But see Calley v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 650 (M.D. Ga. 1974), rev'd,

519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976); United States
v. Ehrlichman, Crim. No. 74-116 (D.D.C. July 3, 1974), aff'd in part, 44 U.S.L.W.
2543 (D.C. Cir. May 17, 1976), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S.
Dec. 11, 1976). Both cases are discussed at text accompanying notes 22-41 supra.
251 See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 140, at 234-303; Congressional Papers,
note 1 supra.
252

See U.S. CON T. art. I, § 6, cl. 3 (publication clause), discussed at notes

17-60 & accompanying text supra. Cf. T.

EMERSON,

note 176 supra (advocating

similar test to differentiate protected first amendment expression from unprotected
conduct).
253 The fact that the speech or debate clause creates an "absolute" immunity
in that an unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951), hardly makes every invocation of the privilege
a worthy one.
254 Cf. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (proposed standard for enjoining publication of newspaper article).
255 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 67, § 2192, at 70. See also, e.g., Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972).

